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INTRODUCTION
The traditional Anglo-American distrust for secret trials has been variously ascribed to the notorious use of this practice by the Spanish Inquisition, to the excesses of the English Court of Star Chamber, and to the French monarchy's abuse
of the lettre de cachet. All of these institutions obviously symbolized a monaco to
liberty.
-In re Oliver, 19481
Under our Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo
court.
-In re Gault, 19672

Today's juvenile courtroom functions quite differently than
did its 1899 Chicago ancestor.3 During every decade since the

1. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 268-69 (1948) (footnote omitted).
2. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 28 (1967).
3. For three comprehensive historical accounts of the juvenile justice system's development
since its 1899 Chicago founding, see generally ELLEN RYERSON, THE BEST-LAID PLANS:
AMERICA'S JUVENILE COURT EXPERIMENT (1978); JOHN C. WATKINS JR., THE JUVENILE JUSTICE
CENTURY: A SOCIOLEGAL COMMENTARY ON AMERICAN JUVENILE COURTS (1998); Sanford J. Fox,
Juvenile Justice Reform: An HistoricalPerspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187 (1970) (including a
discussion of pre-1899 youth justice).
A number of academics, most notably Professor Barry Feld of the University of Minnesota
Law School, have argued that the juvenile reforms of the last three decades have so transformed
the juvenile court-from a social welfare institution "into a scaled-down, second-class criminal
court for young offenders"--that it should be abolished. Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of
the Juvenile Court-Part .11-Race and the "CrackDown" on Youth Crime, 84 MINN. L. REV. 327,
327-31 (1999) [hereinafter Feld, Race and the "CrackDown" on Youth Crime]; see also Barry C.
Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court. Youthfulness, CriminalResponsibility, and Sentencing Policy,
88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68, 69 (1997) C'No compelling reasons exist to maintain separate
from an adult criminal court, a punitive juvenile court whose only remaining distinctions are its
persisting procedural difficulties.") [hereinafter Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court]; Barry C. Fold,
The Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court. An Empirical Study of When Lawyers Appear and the
Difference They Make, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1185, 1187-88 (1989) (same) [hereinafter
Feld, The Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court];Barry C. Feld, The Transformationof the Juvenile
Court, 75 MINN. L. REV. 691, 691-93 (1991) (arguing that the juvenile system is merely a mirrorimage of the adult criminal system, with more procedural problems) [hereinafter Feld, Transformation of the American Juvenile Court].
Other notable juvenile scholars have echoed Feld's concerns and have endorsed his solution,
See, e.g., Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructingthe Legal Order: The
Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083, 1083-85 (1991) (same) [hereinafter
Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood]; Janet E. Ainsworth, Youth Justice in a Unified Court
Response to Critics of Juvenile Court Abolition, 36 B.C. L. REV. 927, 928-30 (1995) (proposing
abolition of the juvenile court, and replacement with a unified criminal court, because its "promise of individualized dispositions crafted with attention to the social needs of the juvenile offender" have proven to be "a cruel hoax") [hereinafter Ainsworth, Youth Justice in a Unified
Court];Katherine Hunt Federle, The Abolition of the Juvenile Court."A Proposalfor the Preserva.
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1960s, the juvenile court system has undergone a number of fundamental, structural changes. 4 The most recent of these "mega
change[s]" 5 came during the 1990s, when a number of states abandoned their existing presumptive closure statutes and mandated

tion of Children'sLegal Rights, 16 J. CONTEMP. L. 23, 25 (1990) C'[I]f there is a chance that children have rights and the ability to exercise them, then [what] inevitably results i[s] the abolition
of the juvenile court."). But see Irene Merker Rosenberg, Leaving Bad Enough Alone: A Response
to the Juvenile Court Abolitionists, 1993 WIS. L REV. 163, 165 ("1 do not... [believe] ...in the
abolitionist solution, even though it is prompted by a despair that I do share.").
4. The most important development of the 1960s was the Supreme Coures 1967 In re
Gault decision. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (196). InGault, the Court largely formalized the juvenile courtroom by extending to youths the constitutional rights to counsel, confrontation of witnesses, notice of charges, and the privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 1-59.
The 1970s brought another seminal juvenile decision, In re Winship, in which the Court held
that the constitutional requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt applies in delinquency
proceedings, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970), thus leaving considerable doubt whether those proceedings remained "civil" or had become full-blown criminal prosecutions. See id. at 365-66 C([Civil
labels and good intentions do not themselves obviate the need for criminal due process safeguards in juvenile courts...."). The Court's 1971 McKeiver v. Pennsylvaniadecision resolved
that question, although only five members of the Court (Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Blackmun, Brennan, Stewart, White), in scattered opinions, agreed that delinquency proceedings
"hafdj not yet been held to be... 'criminal prosecution[a],' within the meaning and reach of the
Sixth Amendment...." McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 541 (1971) (emphasis added);
id. at 553 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (agreeing with Justice Blackmun's plurality
opinion that juvenile proceedings are not "criminal prosecutions"). But see id. at 571 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) ("The argument that the adjudication of delinquency is not the equivalent of criminal
process is spurious."). This Note suggests below, but does not conclude, that juvenile delinquency proceedings may have changed so substantially since 1971 that they have become "criminal prosecutions" within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment, even though they were not at the
time of McKeiver. See infra Part ILA.2.
This suggestion would seem to be bolstered by one of the major shifts of the 1980s: the increased use of juvenile waiver statutes, which allow for "serious or chronic young offenders...
[to] be tried and sentenced as... adults." Marcy Rasmussen Podkopacz & Barry C. Feld, Judicial Waiver Policyand Practice:Persistence,Seriousness, and Race, 14 LAW & INEQ. 73, 74 (1995)
[hereinafter Podkopacz & Feld, Judicial Waiver Policyand Practice];see also Feld, Race and the
"CrackDown'on Youth Crime, supranote 3, at 357 & n.81 ("The rate ofjudicial waiver increased
68% between 1988 and 1992."); arcy Rasmussen Podkopacz & Barry C. Feld, The End of the
Line: An Empirical Study of Judicial Waiver, 86 J. CRIM.L. & CRIMiNOLOGY 449, 456-57 (1996)
(describing Minnesota's early-1980s statutory shift toward waiver through a provision presumptively finding youths un-amenable to treatment) [hereinafter Podkopacz & Feld, An Empirical
Study of JudicialWaiver].
5. E. Hunter Hurst, III, The Juvenile Court at 100 Years ofAge. The Death of Optimism, 49
Juv. & FA L Or.J. 39, 40-44 (1998) (describing five recent "mega change[s]" in juvenile legislation: increased use of criminal jurisdiction through waiver, experimentation with new sentencing
options, development of new correctional programs, inclusion ofjuvenile victims as "active participants" in the juvenile justice process, and, of course, the opening of proceedings and records).
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that juvenile delinquency proceedings 6 be held in the open for the
press and the public to see.7

The policy reviews of this development have been mixed.
Some commentators criticize the recent trend, asserting that open
proceedings enervate the juvenile system's ultimate goal of rehabilitating wayward youths.8 Others laud the new openness, arguing
that closure no longer serves the rehabilitative ethic, 9 or that young
offenders need to be held accountable to the body politic for their
increasingly violent and adult-like wrongs against society. 10 This

Note also praises the trend toward openness, but it takes a different tack than do these commentators; it suggests, as the United

States Supreme Court suggested in Oliver, that if a person's liberty
is at stake, public scrutiny is the only "tolerably efficient check"
6. Throughout this Note, the terms "juvenile proceedings," "delinquency proceedings," "juvenile delinquency proceedings," and 'juvenile court proceedings" are all used interchangeably;
no difference in meaning is intended. For purposes of this Note, these proceedings include juvenile transfer hearings.
7. This trend began around 1992. PATRIcIA M. ToRBET ET AL., STATE RESPONSES TO
SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME: RESEARCH REPORT 36 (1996) [hereinafter TORBET]. It

gained momentum in the latter half of the 1990s; during the 1996-97 period alone, twelve states
modified or enacted legislation permitting open juvenile court hearings. See PATRICIA M. TORBET
& LINDA SZYMANSKI, STATE RESPONSES TO SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME: 1996-97
UPDATE 8-11 (1998) (outlining the trend of states' de-emphasizing closure and their new empha.
sis on information sharing) [hereinafter TORBET & SZYMANSKI]. See also infra note 13 (enumerating the fifty-one jurisdictions' access statutes).
8. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Laubenstein, Comment, Media Access to Juvenile Justic" Should
Freedom of the Press Be Limited to Promote Rehabilitation of Youthful Offenders?, 68 TEMP. L.
REV. 1897, 1897 & n.5, 1901-08 (1995) (arguing that media access to juvenile proceedings must
be limited because it otherwise may serve to perpetuate the "publid's flawed perception" of a
juvenile crime wave and because it "will likely impede... [a juvenile's] rehabilitation" by "in.
creas[ing] his self-perception of his own delinquency") (citing Smith v. Daily Mail Pubrg Co., 443
U.S. 97, 107-08 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (declaring that closed proceedings and sealed
records are essential to the rehabilitation of youthful offenders)); cf. Judith Resnik, Due Process:
A Public Dimension, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 405, 414 (1987) (finding that "the uses to which the information [from open criminal trials] will be put are far from certain").
9. See, e.g., Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood, supra note 3, at 1128-30 (observing that
"low public visibility" in the juvenile setting may lead juvenile judges, who have heavy caseloads,
to cut corners and render inappropriate treatment to youths in need of rehabilitation); Gordon A.
Martin, Jr., Open the Doors: A Judicial Call to End Confidentiality in Delinquency Proceedings,
21 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 393, 394-95 (1995) C'[E]limination of juvenile

delinquency's historic cloak of confidentiality is essential to rebuilding trust and dissipating the
fear that the closed juvenile system fosters.") (footnote omitted) [hereinafter Martin, Open the
Doors]; Joseph B. Sanborn, Jr., The Right to a Public Jury Trial: A Need for Today's Juvenile
Court, 76 JUDICATURE 230, 236 (1993) (arguing that access to delinquency proceedings "helps
keep the judge under control and eliminates the hearing's secret nature, which both hides and
promotes carelessness and cavalier attitudes on the part of court workers") (footnotes omitted).
10. See, e.g., Arthur R. Blum, Comment, Disclosing the Identities of Juvenile Felons: Introducing Accountability to Juvenile Justice, 27 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 349, 400 (1996) (concluding that
public access is a desirable policy because it holds young offenders accountable for "crimes which
society cannot, and should not, forget').
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against potential abuse or malfunction of the adjudicative process."
It argues that, aside from the states' policy-based reasons for abandoning presumptive closure statutes, serious due process problems
inhere in presumptive closure schemes. Thus, this Note does not
concern itself with the states that have recently overturned their
presumptive closure statutes; it instead turns its attention toward
the nineteen jurisdictions that retain theirs. 12
This Note concludes that the nineteen remaining presumptive closure statutes 3 are unconstitutional because they violate the
11. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 271 (1948) (quoting 1 JEREM-NY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF
JUDICiAL EVIDENCE 524 (1827)).
12. The nineteen closure jurisdictions are Alabama, Alaska, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Idaho, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
13. The nineteen closure statutes remaining on the books are remarkably similar. Virtually
all of them clearly establish the baseline that members of the general public and of the press will
be excluded from juvenile proceedings unless the juvenile judge finds that some of them have a
"direct" or "proper" interest in the matter. See ALA. CODE § 12-15-65(a) (1995 & Lxis Supp.
2000); ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.070(a) (Michie 2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-76(h) (West
1994) (mandatory closure); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2316(e) (1997 & Lexis Supp. 2000); IDAHO CODE
§ 16-1608(b) (Michie 1979 & Supp. 2000); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 610.070(3) (Michie 1999); MASS.
GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 119, § 65 (West 1993 & Supp. 2000); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-203(6) (2000);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §169-B:34()(a) (1994 & Lexis Supp. 2000) (mandatory closure); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A.4A-60(i) (West 1987 & Supp. 2000); N.Y. JUD. CT. ACTS § 341.1 (McKinney 1999);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.35(A) (West Supp. 2000); ILL GEN. LAWIS § 14-1-30 (1994); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 20-7-755 (Law. Co-op. 1985 & \Vest Supp. 2000); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-124(d)
(1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5523(c) (1991 & Lexis Supp. 1999); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-2(1)
(Michie 1999 & Lexis Supp. 2000); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.299(1)(a) (West 1997 & Supp. 2000);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-224(b) (Michie 1999).

Many of the states that have recently overturned their closure statutes have simply turned
this presumption on its head; thus, twelve states now provide for presumptively open juvenile
proceedings that can be closed by the juvenile judge if she finds good cause for doing so. Sea
ARIz. JUV. Or. R. 7(c)(3) (West 1997 & Supp. 2000); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-1-106(2) (West
1997 & Supp. 2000); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.205 (West 1996 & Supp. 2001); IND. CODE ANN. § 3132-6-2 (Michie 1997); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.39 (West 2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1652 (2000);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.17(7) (West 1993 & Supp. 2000); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
62.193(1) (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1999); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-16(B) (Michie 1995); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 7B-801(a) (1999); TF.Y FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.08(a) (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2001); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.140(6) (West 1993 & Supp. 2001). The constitutionality of these (also
remarkably similar) statutes is beyond the scope of this Note, but the Note presupposes their
constitutionality because they appear, on their faces, to be less invasive of the juvenile's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights than presumptive closure statutes.
Fifteen other states provide that their juvenile proceedings shall be closed where the youth
has committed a minor offense, but that the proceedings will be open to press and public where
the youth has committed an offense that would be a felony or other serious crime under the respective state's criminal code. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 676(a)(1)-(28) (West 1998 & Supp.
2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 1063(a) (1999); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-78(b)(1) (Supp. 2000);
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 571-41(b), 571-84.6(c) (Michie 1999); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. Ch.C, art.
879(B) (West 1995 & Supp. 2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 3307(2) (West 1980 & Supp.
2000); MD. CODE ANN., Ors & JUD. PROC. § 3-812(0 (1995 & Lenxs Supp. 2000); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 260B.163(c) (West 1998 & Supp. 2001); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.171(6) (West 1996 & Supp.
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Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The argument
proceeds in two major Parts. Part I lays the necessary factual
groundwork for the case against the statutes by describing how
they affect today's juvenile proceedings. Part II introduces and
evaluates three separate-but related-constitutional challenges to
the statutes. That is, it briefly acknowledges and rejects First
Amendment and Sixth Amendment arguments, and it then raises a
freestanding Fourteenth Amendment due process argument. 14 Part
II suggests that, while both the First and Sixth Amendment arguments could reasonably be brought to bear on presumptive closure
statutes, 15 only the freestanding due process claim has a strong
chance of succeeding under existing Supreme Court jurisprudence.1
This Note concludes that the statutes are "fundamentally unfair"
under that jurisprudence and can no longer withstand constitutional scrutiny.

2001); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-24(5) (1991 & Lexis Supp. 1999); OKLA. STAT. ANN, tit. 10 §
7303-4.2(A) (West 1998); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6336(e) (West 2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §
26-7A-36 (Lexis 1999); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-l15(1)(b).(c) (1996 & Lexis Supp. 2000); VA.
CODE ANN. § 16.1-302 (Michie 1999). This Note presupposes that these diverse statutes are
constitutional as well.
Three states mandate open proceedings, in one form or another, without allowing discretion
for closure. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-325(i)(2) (Michie 1998 & Lexis Supp. 1999) (providing
juveniles with the right to a hearing open to both public and press); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §
405/1-5(6) (West 1999 & Supp. 2000) (providing for mandatory openness to the press, but not to
the general public); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1502 (7) (1999) (providing for mandatory openness
to the general public).
Two states, Nebraska and Oregon, have no statutes regarding access. See generally NEB.
REV. STAT. ch. 43 (1998); OI. REV. STAT. § 419 (1995).
14. As it is used here, the term "freestanding" means only that the argument does not rest
upon incorporation against the states of the First Amendment's protections, of the Sixth
Amendment's guarantee of a public trial in all "criminal prosecutions," or of any other of the Bill
of Rights' safeguards. Rather, it rests solely upon independent due process (i.e., "fundamental
fairness") grounds.
15. One commentator has, indeed, argued authoritatively that, closure of juvenile delinquency proceedings raises serious First Amendment concerns. See generally Joshua M. Dalton,
At the Crossroads of Richmond and Gault. Addressing Media Access to Juvenile Delinquency
Proceedings Through a FunctionalAnalysis, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 1155 (1998) (concluding
that, under the First Amendment and Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555
(1980), "experience and logic' mandate that delinquency proceedings be presumptively open to
the press). There is no need to reproduce Dalton's comprehensive analysis in this Note. None.
theless, the press's First Amendment claim against presumptive closure is briefly summarized
below, see infra Part II.A.1, to illustrate that, while the claim is a fairly powerful one, the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is a stronger constitutional source than the First
Amendment for striking down closure schemes.
16. Along with the First Amendment argument, the Sixth Amendment argument is fairly
convincing, though this Note argues that a realistic and cautious interpretation of existing Court
doctrine counsels against adopting that argument whole-heartedly. See infra Part II.A.2.
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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND: TODAY'S JUVENILE PROCEEDINGS
(AND THE STATUTES THAT CLOSE THEM)

The typical presumptive closure statute provides that "the
general public shall be excluded from hearings"1 7 unless the juvenile judge, in her sole discretion, finds a very good reason' 8 for allowing some level of access. This baseline of closure makes sense if
one still accepts the juvenile justice system's original theories of
9 and if one believes that state
rehabilitation and parens patriae,1
legislatures likewise still accept them. Those foundational ideals
were, indeed, sound and promising at the time of the juvenile
court's inception in 1899. Today, however, they are questionable
bases upon which to rest the closure of juvenile delinquency proceedings.
One academic has concluded that "a review of the assumptions underlying the juvenile court shows it to be a bankrupt legal
institution. The theories that have guided juvenile law through the
twentieth century are without foundation."20 While this view may
overstate the case, an examination of those theories in light of today's realities reveals a troubled court system that has fallen short
of the idyllic "supermarket of social services" 21 its pioneers sought
to establish. Today's youths are faced instead with an institution
that, for two reasons, closely resembles the adult criminal justice
system. First, most states have largely abandoned the rehabilitative ethic in favor of a more punitive approach. 22 Second, recognizing that this new punishment ethic puts a young offender's liberty
at stake, the United States Supreme Court has, over the past three
decades, doctrinally departed from the early systemic vision of parens patriaeinformality by affixing necessary procedural safeguards

17.

E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2316(e) (1997 & Lexis Supp. 2000).

18. Again, most of the closure statutes allow the judge to open the proceedings in a limited
fashion by admitting those persons having a "direct" or "proper" interest in the matter. See
supra note 13. Two closure states-Connecticut and New Hampshire-mandate that the proceedings be closed under all circumstances, leaving the judge no discretion to admit such persons. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-76(h) (West 1994); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §169-B:34(I)(a)
(1994 & Lexis Supp. 2000).
19. Under this doctrine, the state figuratively steps into the shoes of a juvenile's parents or
guardian, providing "civic and moral education as well as general nurturance." VATKINS, supra

note 3, at 9. That is, the state simply takes a delinquent child "into custody" rather than "arrest[ing]" him or her. Id. at 43-48. The state then proceeds to "protect and rehabilitate" the

child in his or her "best interest," at least theoretically. Id. at 48.
20. Gary B. Melton, Taking Gault Seriously: Toward a New Juvenile Court, 68 NEB. L. REV.
146, 166 (1989).
21. WATKINS, supra note 3, at 50-51 & n.U.
22.

See infra Part L.A.
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to juvenile proceedings. 23 This Part of the Note summarizes each of
these two fundamental transformations, which call into question
the continued constitutional vitality of the presumptive closure
statutes. The Part then concludes by describing why those statutes
were initially enacted, and how they affect today's juvenile court
system.
A. From Rehabilitationto Punishment
1. Early Visions of Rehabilitation
While the adult criminal justice system has largely abandoned the goal of rehabilitation,2 4 the youth justice system continues to identify it as a main objective. 25 In the juvenile court's early
years, juvenile theorists and practitioners sought mechanisms that
26
would save young offenders before they became unsalvageable.
These progressive penal reformers hoped to remove the concept of
blame from juvenile proceedings, emphasizing instead that delinquents were simply needy, troubled children incapable of criminalmindedness. 27 The reformers demanded an institution in which the

main philosophical objective would be to eliminate deviant behavior
during its early phases. 28 Most importantly, they sought a proba-

23. See infra Part I.B.
24. See Gordon A. Martin, Jr., The Delinquent and the Juvenile Courk Is There Still a Place
for Rehabilitation?,25 CONN. L. REV. 57, 58 (1992) [hereinafter Martin, Is There Still a Placefor
Rehabilitation. Though the word "penitentiary" itself does reflect an early rehabilitative approach, "[the perceived failure of the criminal justice and penal systems to deter recidivism
[and] ... [t]he adoption in 1987 by Congress of the United States Sentencing Guidelines... are
indicative of society's embrace of the punitive model of criminal justice." Id. (footnotes omitted).
25. Id. at 59-60.
26. See RYERSON, supra note 3, at 19 (noting that early juvenile models "were built upon the
encouraging notion that, under strict supervision away from the normal world of excitement and
temptation, children who broke the law could learn the values and habits which make upstanding citizens").
27. See id. at 37 (discussing the petition procedures that the reformers constructed when
they removed the criminal complaint procedure and its resulting "implication that the child was
capable of criminal intent'); Fox, supra note 3, at 1191 (stating that "the reformers fully understood that these children were guilty of little more than being poor and neglected"). See generally
Fox, supra note 3 (providing extensive discussion about early theories and proponents of rehabilitation).
28. See WATKINS, supra note 3, at 49 (stating that this "ethos" of prevention, which would
supposedly "reduce youth crime by eradicating delinquent behavior in its 'budding' stages," was
one of the founders' rudimentary goals).
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tionary institution that could replace bad behavior with good.2 In
short, this approach would develop, rather than'punish, the child. 30
On various occasions, the Supreme Court has recognized the
rehabilitative approach as worthwhile. 31 It has observed that many
juveniles need protection from themselves because they lack sound
judgment and often make poor decisions. 32 Chief Justice Rehnquist
in particular has evinced a continuing faith in the system's rehabilitation tenet, remarking that it is "born of a tender concern for
the welfare of the child."33 He and the Court's other members have
thus ensured the survival of rehabilitation as a primary goal of the
35
juvenile system, 34 but not without some misgivings.

29. See id. at 50. Watkins notes the reformers' desire for "a tribunal whose probation division would, in effect, open to the juvenile a 'supermarket of social services' under the aegis of a
new social science." Id. at 49-50 (footnote omitted).
30. See Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 107 (1909) (calling for
treatment of wayward children, "not so much to punish as to reform, not to degrade but to uplift,
not to crush but to develop, not to make him a criminal but a worthy citizen").
31. See, e.g., Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 266 (1984) CSociety has a legitimate interest in
protecting a juvenile from the consequences of his criminal activity...
32. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979).
33. Smith v. Daily Mail Pubrg Co., 443 U.S. 97, 107-08 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring)
(noting that rehabilitation increases "youths' prospects for adjustment in society and acceptance
by the public"). In Smith, then-Associate Justice Rehnquist also asserted the importance of
confidentiality to this end, stating that dissemination of a juvenile offender's name may defeat
rehabilitation. Id. at 108 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (stating that publicity "place[s] additional
stress on [the juvenile] during a difficult period of adjustment in the community, and it interfere[s] with his adjustment at various points when he [is] otherwise proceeding adequately")
(quoting David C. Howard et al., Publicity and Juvenile Court Proceedings, 11 CLEARINGHOUSE
REV. 203, 210 (1977)).
34. See Julianne P. Sheffer, Note, Serious and HabitualJuvenile Offender Statutes: ReconcilingPunishmentand RehabilitationWithin the Juvenile Justice System, 48 VAND. L REV. 479,
483-84 (1995). Sheffer notes that "even while there is evidence that the juvenile court is becoming more punitive, neither legislatures nor courts are yet willing to abandon the goal of rehabilitation" Id. The Supreme Courts own hesitancy to acknowledge this evidence, most notably in
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,403 U.S. 528, 544-46 (1971), has possibly caused these lawmakers and
courts to balk at wholesale renunciation of the treatment ideal
35. In Gault, the Court "candidly appraised" the first tenet of the juvenile court, 387 U.S. 1,
21-22 (1967), and concluded that "[t]he constitutional and theoretical basis for this peculiar system is-to say the least-debatable." Id. at 17; see also Melton, supra note 20, at 148 n.18 ("In
Gault itself the Court made unmistakably clear its viev that the juvenile court had failed to
accomplish its stated purposes and, indeed, that it had often operated in countertherapeutic
ways.").
In McKeiver, the Court found "that the fond and idealistic hopes of the juvenile court proponents and early reformers of three generations ago have not been realized." Mceiver, 403 U.S.
at 543-44. Yet "[d]espite all these disappointments, all these failures, all these shortcomings,"
the Court was unwilling to "put an effective end to ... [the] idealistic prospect of an intimate,
informal protective proceeding" by extending juveniles the right to a jury trial Id. at 545; see
also infra Part ll.A.2.
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2. The Shift Toward Punishment

The Court's misgivings are partially due to the fact that the
youth justice system has worked to serve not only rehabilitation,
but the sometimes-conflicting goal of punishment

6

as well.3 7 Pun-

ishment took on unforeseen significance at an early date because
the system's officers discovered that rehabilitation could not be attained on as grand a scale as they had originally hoped. 88 They
lacked the resources to individualize treatment for a seemingly infinite number of juvenile offenders, and they were quickly forced to
reconsider goals that had proven unworkable.3 9 Their vision of
"treatment" necessarily regressed into simply detaining wayward
children in massive congregate institutions that provided neither
the attention nor the guidance the system's founders sought. 40 Indeed, the consequences were unintentionally but diametrically opposed to the founders' early vision; juvenile justice was massproduced and ceased to be case-specific, serious and benign offenders mingled, recidivism increased rapidly and, most discouragingly,
some children who had merely misbehaved became hardened, re41
current offenders.

36. "Punishment" can include a mix of purposes, including incapacitation and retribution.
See Martin L. Forst & Martha-Elin Blomquist, CrackingDown on Juveniles: The Changing Ide.
ology of Youth Corrections,5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHIcs & PUB. POLY 323, 333-37 (1991).
37. See In re KB., 639 A.2d 798, 800-01 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (Cirillo, J.) (labeling the system "schizophrenic" because of its equal emphasis on rehabilitation and punishment); see also
Catherine J. Ross, Dispositionin a DiscretionaryRegime: Punishment and Rehabilitationin the
Juvenile Justice System, 36 B.C. L. REV. 1037, 1058 (1995) (recognizing the juvenile system's
dual goals); Sheffer, supra note 34, at 482-86 (conceding that rehabilitation may be the stated
goal, but also explaining that the punishment ethic has been an increasingly important influence
on the juvenile court in recent years).
38. See Jennifer M. O'Connor & Linda Y. Treat, Note, Getting Smart About Getting Tough:
Juvenile Justice and the Possibility of ProgressiveReform, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1299, 1303-04
(1996) (describing how the juvenile system quickly fell short of its optimistic aims).
39. Id. at 1303 (describing how "the system soon moved toward aggregate treatment as it
became overburdened by growing numbers of juvenile offenders," and how its "factory-like approach to dispositions" would send youths through the process "numerous times with little more
than a slap on the wrist") (footnote omitted). While industrialization and urbanization at the
turn of the century gave rise to Progressive juvenile dogma, the Industrial Revolution no doubt
also thrust a heavy juvenile offense rate upon a fledgling system that was not prepared to handle
it. See id. at 1302-04.
40. See id. at 1303-04 (accounting for how the juvenile system unavoidably shifted its focus
from rehabilitation to punishment).
41. Id. ("Youths were placed in these facilities for periods ranging from weeks to years, and
the treatment or response [if any] was not tailored to the severity of the crime."); see also Forst &
Blomquist, supra note 36, at 332-33 (finding merit to the suggestion "that informal procedures,
contrary to original intent, may themselves have constituted a further obstacle to effective
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Some statistics and studies thus indicate that the juvenile
system has largely failed in its rehabilitative aims, 42 and that the

problem has only grown worse in recent yearsA3 Perceiving a sharp
increase in juvenile crime, 44 the general public has reacted 45 to such
studies by seeking legislation that makes youths more accountable
for their increasingly violent offenses.4 6 A large number of states,
therefore, have begun to "crack down" on juvenile offenders. 47 These
states have enacted "get tough" statutes 48 that allow for increased
use of judicial waiver or legislative exclusion of specified offenses.
The judicial waiver mechanism gives a juvenile judge wide discretion in deciding whether a youth is dangerous or not amenable to
treatment. 49 If the judge determines that the juvenile "poses a
treatment") (citing PRESIDENT'S COMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND AD.*NISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 85 (1967)).

42. E.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1967) (refusing to ignore "such startling findings as
that reported in an exceptionally reliable study of repeaters or recidivism"). The Gault Court
referred to the Stanford Research Institutes study for the President's Commission on Crime in
the District of Columbia, which revealed that, in 1966, about 66% of sixteen- and seventeen-yearold delinquents brought into custody had been in custody at least once before. Id. at 22.
43. See HOWARD N. SNYDER, JUVENILE ARRESTS 1997 1 (1998) (indicating that the number
of juvenile Violent Crime Index arrests increased by 49% in the decade from 1988-97, while adult
Violent Crime Index arrests increased over the same period by only 1936); Barry C. Feld, Tiolent
Youth and Public Policy: A Case Study of Juvenile Justice Law Reform, 79 MINN. L. REV. 965,
975 (1995) (showing that juveniles commit a disproportionate amount of crime) [hereinafter Feld,
Violent Youth and Public Policy].
44. Owing to the statutory trend toward openness, increased press access to juvenile proceedings has fueled public perception of a juvenile crime wave. See Feld, Violent Youth and
Public Policy,supra note 43, at 982-86 (citing Minnesota's statutory trend toward press coverage
in only the most serious cases, and arguing that the coverage has shaped public perceptions of,
and political responses to, escalation of "violent crime by teenagers,... criminal victimization of
childrenL] ...guns, gangs, drive-by shootings, random violence, and 'senseless' lethal encounters
with juveniles") (footnotes omitted).
45. The public has probably over-reacted to these statistics. By selectively (though perhaps
necessarily) reporting only the most horrific youth offenses, such as axe murders and sexual
assaults, the popular media have probably misled the public into believing that the youth crime
problem is worse than it really is. See id. at 982-86. Indeed, the "popular media are often careless in distinguishing juveniles from those over eighteen years of age. Since so many young
adults continue to dress and act like teenagers, adult offenders may often be mistaken for juveniles, when in fact they are not:' Id. at 983 n.69 (quoting Peter NV. Greenwood, Juvenile Crime
and Juvenile Justice, in CRIE 91 (James Q. Wilson & Joan Petersilia eds., 1994)).
46. See generallyTORBET & SYMIANSEI, supranote 7.
47. See generally Feld, Race and the "Crack Down" on Youth Crime, supra note 3; see also
Forst & Blomquist, supra note 36, at 323-24; Lisa Stansky, More and More States are Telling
Teens: If You Do an Adult Crime, You Serve the Adult Time, 82 A.B.A. J., Nov. 1996, at 60, 61
(showing concern that states are "allowing prosecutors to file certain charges directly in criminal
court, [and] empowering juvenile judges to impose adult-style sentences").
48. Sheffer, supranote 34, at 491 (describing states' "get tough" approaches). See generally
PATRICIA M. TORBET T AL., TRYING JUVENILES AS ADULTS IN CRImNAL COURT:. AN ANALYSIS OF
STATE TRANSFER PROVISIONS (1998).
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threat to public safety," she can waive jurisdiction over the youth,
and send the case to adult criminal court. 50 Similarly, the legislative exclusion mechanism automatically excludes certain enumerated offenses from juvenile court jurisdiction, directing these more

serious cases to the adult system by default. 5 Each of these statutory options assumes that punishment serves many, or even most,
52
youths better than does rehabilitation.
In light of the states' legislation, several commentators have
53
challenged the rehabilitative characterization of juvenile justice.
Some of them argue that the system's dual purposes can coexist and
do justify the juvenile court's continued existence, 5 4 while others

insist on merging the juvenile system into the adult criminal struc-

49. Feld, Transformationof the Juvenile Court, supra note 3, at 703-06 (explaining judicial
waiver at length); see also TORBET & SZYMANSKI, supra note 7, at 4 (updating states' judicial
waiver schemes through 1997, and showing that forty-six jurisdictions had provided for it).
50. Feld, Transformationof the Juvenile Court, supra note 3, at 703-04.
51. Id. at 706-08 (explaining legislative exclusion at length); see also TORBET & SZYMIANSKI,
supranote 7, at 4 (updating states' legislative exclusion schemes through 1997, and showing that
twenty-eight jurisdictions had provided for it); O'Connor & Treat, supra note 38, at 1312 (indicating that exclusion is typically reserved for "those juveniles accused of serious offenses such as
murder and other offenses against persons") (footnote omitted).
52. See Federle, supra note 3, at 50 (asserting that "[a]utomatic waiver provisions inherently contradict the concept of child incompetence and eliminate the very justification for a separate juvenile court!). Some evidence indicates that these increasingly punitive measures have
not helped recidivism rates. See Donna M. Bishop et al., Juvenile Justice Under Attack: An
Analysis of the Causes and Impact of Recent Reforms, 10 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POLY 129, 155
(1998) (finding that the best evidence indicates that neither rehabilitation nor "the rush to impose adult status on juveniles" is preventing offenders from offending again); Richard E.
Redding, Examining Legal Issues: Juvenile Offenders in Criminal Court and Adult Prison, 61
CORRECTIONS TODAY, Apr. 1, 1999, at 92, available at 1999 WL 14218781 (declaring that
"[c]learly, transfer to criminal court results in higher recidivism rates for most types of offenders").
53. See, e.g., Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood, supra note 3, at 1105 ('From a world in
which the child by definition was morally incapable of committing a crime, we have now passed
to a world in which juveniles are to be held strictly accountable for their crimes."); Federle, supra
note 3, at 38-39 & n.79 (The new juvenile court is a model of accountability, retribution, and
deterrence."); Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court, supra note 3, at 68 (remarking that state "reforms have converted the historical ideal of the juvenile court as a social welfare institution into
a penal system that provides young offenders with neither therapy nor justice"); Forst & Blom.
quist, supra note 36, 374-75; Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 165-66; Charles E. Springer, RehabilitMting the Juvenile Court, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POLY 397, 398 (1991) (finding an
"inherent conceptual fallacy [in the assertion) that a court can be made into a clinic"). But see
Martin, Is There Still a Place for Rehabilitation?,supra note 24, at 59. Judge Martin indicates
that he has not completely given up on rehabilitation, which he believes could be salvaged by
offering "alternatives to the increased transfer and exclusion of juveniles that might temper the
concerns of the public with less compromise of the rehabilitative ideal." Id. at 64.
54. See, e.g., Martin, Is There Still a Placefor Rehabilitation?,supra note 24, at 63-64; Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 184-85 (rejecting the abolitionist solution but agreeing with Professor
Feld that juvenile courts impose punishment in the name of treatment); Sheffer, supra note 34,
at 510.
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ture. 55 These two camps do agree, however, that as the present juvenile court steadily becomes a more punitive mechanism, procedural rights must be strengthened concomitantly because youths
risk a greater loss of liberty.66
B. From Parens Patriae to Procedure
1. Early Visions of ParensPatriae
As with the early aim of rehabilitation, the doctrine of parens patriae in the juvenile court was promising at the outset. With
this guardianship ideal 57 in mind, the early reformers attempted to
differentiate the juvenile institution from the existing criminal system.58 The juvenile court was "civil" in nature, and its processes

55. E.g., Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood, supra note 3, at 1118; Federle, supra note 3,
at 49-51; Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court, supra note 3, at 69; Francis Barry McCarthy, Delinquency Dispositions Under the Juvenile Justice Standards: The Consequences of a Change of
Rationale, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1093, 1118 (1977) (resolving that "it would be more efficient to
preserve the distinction between adult and youth sentencing by incorporating it into a criminal
statute than by maintaining a separate judicial system").
56. See e.g., Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood, supra note 3, at 1118-32 (arguing, in a
section entitled "Abolishing the Separate and Unequal Juvenile Court," that the court's procedural informalities no longer make sense in a society where the "child-adult dichotomy" has been
obliterated by punitive juvenile legislation); Federle, supra note 3, at 51 (lamenting that
"[a]lIthough the distinction between delinquency and crime has blurred, there has been no concomitant expansion of constitutional protections nor a willingness to enforce existing legal
rights"); Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court,supra note 3, at 87 (similarly protesting that "[diespite
the criminalizing of juvenile courts, most states provide neither special procedures to protect
youths from their own immaturity nor the full panoply of adult procedural safeguards"); McCarthy, supra note 55, at 1112 (Th[e] shift away from a preoccupation with individualized treatment toward a more traditional criminal law approach to juvenile justice serves as the catalyst
for a change in the procedures by which dispositional decisions are to be made."); Rosenberg,
supranote 3, at 174-75 (arguing that the separate juvenile system should be retained because, if
appropriate reforms were enacted, the juvenile system would promise strongerprocedural protections for youths than would the adult criminal system); see also Kent v. United States, 383 U.S.
541, 556 (1966) (not yet applying constitutional protections to juvenile proceedings, but finding
that children in juvenile courts "receive[ ] the worst of both worlds" because both rehabilitative
resources and procedural protections from punishment are lacking); David R. Barrett et al,
Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, and Individualized Justice, 79 HARV. L.
REV.775, 808-10 (1966) (finding, before Gault, that the system lacked resources to adequately
rehabilitate youths, and that its informal in-court and out-of-court procedures could not be justified) (cited in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 11 & n.7 (1967)).
57. See RYERSON, supra note 3, at 66 (describing the parenspatrioe doctrine as "[t]he belief
that the delinquent resembled the dependent in that each had suffered at the hand of society,
and that both therefore needed the protection of the state").
58. See WATKINS, supranote 3, at 157; see generally id. at 127-216 (describing at length the
overall structure of the juvenile courtroom, pretrial process, adjudication, and disposition procedures). "[Tihe child savers opted for a setting less ceremonial and intimidating than the tradi-
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were directed toward discovering the cause of a child's
delinquency. 59 This enabled the court and its probation staff, as
parenspatriae,to shape a personalized disposition that fit the "best
interest of the child." 60 The juvenile in need of the court's help was
not to be found "guilty," and the proceedings were "nonjudgmental."6' 1
A judge in this system needed wide discretion in crafting the
ideal and case-specific disposition. 62 That latitude allowed for tailored sentences, and it also permitted the judge to "waive" jurisdiction over particularly persistent or violent offenders when even specialized treatment could not help. 63 Notably, transfer maintained
the paternalistic ideal; these persistent offenders simply had less
hope of realizing the rehabilitation brought by parens patriae, and
64
were thought to be better served by a punitive criminal system.
2. The Shift Toward Procedure
The Supreme Court first acknowledged the suspect nature of
the parens patriae doctrine in In re Gault,65 finding that "[t]he
Latin phrase proved to be a great help to those who sought to rationalize the exclusion of juveniles from the constitutional scheme[,]
but its meaning is murky and its historic credentials are of dubious
relevance." 66 In Gault, In re Winship,67 and Breed v. Jones,68 the
Court responded to this revelation of a disturbing "gap between the
originally benign conception of the [juvenile] justice system and its

tional criminal courtroom." Id. at 157. The "tone and atmosphere was more akin to a child.
guidance clinic than to a judicial proceeding." Id.
59. See id. at 157-58.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 49.
62. See CHRISTOPHER MANFREDI, THE SUPREME COURT AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 184 (1998)

(stating that juvenile court judges have enjoyed "almost unlimited discretion to impose indeter.
minate dispositions"); Feld, Transformationof the Juvenile Court, supranote 3, at 700 (observing

that "[h]istorically, juvenile court sentences were discretionary [and] indeterminate").
63. Of course, the power to decide whether a given offender is particularly persistent or
violent resides solely with the judge. See Feld, Transformationof the Juvenile Court, supra note
3, at 701 (explaining that, under judicial waiver, "a judge may transfer jurisdiction on a discretionary basis after a hearing to determine whether a youth is amenable to treatment or a throat
to public safety").
64. See id.
65. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
66. Id. at 16.
67. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
68. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
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by steadily "mak[ing] applicable in juvenile proceedings

constitutional guarantees associated with traditional criminal
prosecutions." 70 In doing so, the Court repeatedly affirmed that the
elusive parens patriae ethic must give way to young offenders' due
process rights.
In Gault, the Court held that juveniles are entitled to 1)
adequate and timely notice of charges; 7 1 2) legal counsel; 72 3) confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses; 73 and 4) the privilege

against self-incrimination. 74 The Gault Court acknowledged that
the juvenile court's founders had insisted upon discarding the "apparent rigidities, technicalities, and harshness which they observed

in both substantive and procedural criminal law,"70 but it nonetheless insisted that "[d]ue process of law is the primary and indispensable foundation of individual freedom." 76 While the Court had not
specified whether juveniles were entitled to any procedural protec-

tions whatsoever prior to this constitutional landmark,7 7 the Gault
decision removed all doubt by emphatically and famously declaring
that "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is
78
for adults alone."
In Winship, the Court extended to juvenile proceedings the
traditional criminal procedural requirement that guilt be estab-

69. Id. at 528.
70. Id. at 528-29. For a complete account of how the Court brought juvenile justice institutions under constitutional control in these cases, see generally MANFREDI, supra note 62, at 53155.
71. Gault, 387 U.S., at 31-34. Justice Fortas wrote the majority opinion. Id. at 1-59.
72. Id. at 34-42.
73. Id. at 42-57.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 15.
76. Id. at 20-21 & n27 (citing Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1945) (opinion of
Frankfurter, J.) ("The history of American freedom is, in no small measure, the history of procedure.")).
77. See Monrad G. Paulsen, The ConstitutionalDomestication of the Juvenile Court, 1967
Sup. Or. REV. 233, 233-34 (quipping that one obscene and offensive telephone call to a neighbor
assured Gerald Francis Gault "a kind of immortality [because h]is name is carried by the first
juvenile court case in history to be decided on constitutional grounds").
78. Gault, 387 U.S. at 13. For two excellent synopses of this and the other Gault holdings,
published shortly after the decision, see generally Paulsen, supra note 77, and The Supreme
Court, 1966 Term-Leading Cases, 81 HARV. L. REV. 171 (1967). For a more extensive discussion
of the decision and the context from which it sprung, see generally B. JAMIES GEORGE, GAULT
AND THE JUVENILE COURT REVOLUTION (1968) (providing a commentary of the case as veU as
transcripts and briefs from every phase of the Gault litigation). The "revolution" description of
Gault predominates; the decision is by far the most important development in the juvenile
coures history. See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, Consequences of Supreme Court Dzcisions Upholding
Individual ConstitutionalRights, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1, 54 (1984) CAkin to Brown v.Board of
Education, Gault has been hailed as the 'keystone' of the rise of a nationwide 'children's liberation' movement.").
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lished by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.7 9 The Court held for the
first time that the reasonable doubt standard in adult criminal trials is of constitutional stature.80 The Court reasoned that "[t]he accused during a criminal prosecution has at stake [an] interest of
immense importance, both because of the possibility that he may
lose his liberty upon conviction and because of the certainty that he
would be stigmatized by the conviction." 81 Having made this significant clarification about the reasonable doubt standard, the Winship
Court then proceeded to apply the constitutional requirement to
juvenile delinquency proceedings, finding that "[tihe same considerations that demand extreme caution in factfinding to protect the
innocent adult apply as well to the innocent child."82 Quoting Gault,
the Court thus held that the Due Process Clause requires the reasonable doubt safeguard in juvenile courts because a "proceeding
where the issue is whether the child will be found to be 'delinquent'
and subjected to the loss of his liberty for years is comparable in
seriousness to a felony prosecution." 83
Finally, in Breed v. Jones, a unanimous Court held applicable in juvenile proceedings the Fifth Amendment's guarantee that
no person shall "be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb." 84 The Court "believe[d] that it [was] simply
too late in the day to conclude ... that a juvenile is not put in jeop-

ardy at a proceeding whose object is to determine whether he has
committed acts that violate a criminal law and whose potential consequences include both the stigma inherent in such a determination
and the deprivation of liberty for many years."8 5

79. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) (holding that, because juveniles are subject to
confinement, they are entitled to this safeguard "as a matter of due process") (quoting In re Winship, 247 N.E.2d 253, 260 (N.Y. 1969) (Fuld, C.J., dissenting)).

80. Id. at 364 ("est there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against

conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which he is charged.").
81. Id. at 363.
82. Id. at 365.
83. Id. at 366 (quoting Gault, 387 U.S. at 36). For a more complete synopsis of the Winship
decision, see generally The Supreme Court, 1969 Term-Leading Cases, 84 HARV. L. REV. 156
(1970).
84. U.S. CONST. amend. V. (incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment against the states
in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969) (declaring that the Double Jeopardy Clause is a
"fundamental ideal in our constitutional heritage" and, as such, must be enforced against the
states)); see generallyBreed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
85. Breed, 421 U.S. at 529 & n.11 (eschewing, once again, the "civil label-of-convenience,
which has been attached to juvenile proceedings") (quoting Gault, 387 U.S. at 50).
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In each of the foregoing cases, the Court's repeated emphasis
on a juvenile's loss of liberty highlights the crucial role that due
process plays in the juvenile context. While those three cases do,
indeed, help to ensure the procedural soundness of delinquency proceedings, significant and unseen procedural infirmities persist inside the juvenile courtroom. 86 Chief among these are statutes dictating the courts' presumptive closure.
C. What Goes on Behind Closed Doors?
1. Early Visions of Closure
The presumptive closure statutes were enacted on the assumption that open proceedings and disclosure of the juvenile's
identity would inhibit his8 7 rehabilitation. 88 Public humiliation and

86. Professor Feld contends that Gault and its progeny "represent[] a procedural revolution
that failed and that produced unintended negative consequences.7 Feld, Race and the "Crack
Down" on Youth Crime, supra note 3, at 350 (emphasis in original). He demonstrates that.
"[p]rocedurally, a substantial gulf still remains between the 'law on the books' and the 'law in
action! in juvenile courts" because, on one hand, "states' laws and policies treat juveniles just like
adults when formal equality results in practical inequality." Id. at 351-52 & n.74 (citing as an
example the Miranda waiver setting, in which "almost all states use the adult standard of
'knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver'... even though juveniles lack the competence of
adults"); see also Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724-27 (1979) (applying the knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver under-the-totality-of.the-circumstances test to the juvenile context).
And on the other hand, Feld points out, "even as juvenile courts have become more punitive,
most states continue to deny juveniles access to jury trials and to other procedural rights guaranteed to adults." Feld, Race and the "Crack Down" on Youth Crime, supra note 3, at 353-54
(citing Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy, supra note 43, at 1099-1108 (discussing states'
provisions and case law regarding juvenile jury trials)).
Other juvenile law scholars have also lamented that the system has fallen short of what
Gault, Winship, and Breed seemed to promise procedurally when they were handed down. See,
e.g., Ainsworth, Youth Justice in a Unified Court, supra note 3, at 928 C"Jiuveniles accused of
law violations receive procedurally and substantively inferior adjudication in comparison to that
accorded adult defendants ....The trials that juveniles accused of crimes do receive are all too
often perfunctory and barely contested."); Melton, supra note 20, at 170, 172 (citing studies that
"have shown that juvenile respondents rarely assert their [F]ifth and [Slixth [A]mendment rights
...[and] there can be no question of its adverse consequences. Not only do juveniles often waive
their rights to silence and counsel during interrogation, they often are not represented by counsel at any stage of the proceeding.") (emphasis in original).
87. This Note often uses the terms "he" and "his" because most juvenile offenders are male.
See SNYDER, supra note 43, at 7 (showing that 74% of all juveniles taken into custody are male).
The percentage of female arrests, however, has increased in recent years. Sce id.
88. WATKINS, supra note 3, at 49 ("Clearly, condemnation and community and personal
stigma were to be avoided at all costs."); see also Mack, supra note 30, at 115 (recommending
that, to promote rehabilitation, "children's cases [should] be heard in a court held in a separate
room or at a separate time from the courts which are held for adult cases, and.., the public who
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criminal stigma were perceived as harmful to the juvenile's selfimage and to his motivation to engage in socially acceptable behavior.8 9 Originally, the statutes were intended to keep a troubled
youth's court proceedings and records sealed to assist in counteracting this potential stigmatizing effect. 90 Intimate and sensitive
information about the offender would be essential for prescription

of appropriate treatment, and closure would ensure that such information would be freely given to social servants without falling

into the wrong hands. 91 Finally, keeping the information private
would prevent any outside political pressure and interference with
92
the judicial process.
2. The Unforeseen (and Unseen) Effects of Closure
Given that legislators have accommodated public cries for
juvenile punishment and accountability, 93 and given that the Supreme Court has extended several important procedural protections
to juvenile proceedings, 94 closure is much more difficult to justify

today than at the time of the statutes' enactment. In addition, while

are not concerned in the cases [should] be excluded from admission") (citing Herbert Samuels, an
English Member of Parliament who introduced this principle in the House of Commons).
89. See WATKINS, supranote 3, at 49. The Supreme Court has recognized that this is indeed
the systemic goal of closure: hiding "youthful errors from the full gaze of the public and bury[ing]
them in the graveyard of the forgotten past" so that youths may be re.integrated into productive
society. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 24 (1967). Nevertheless, while Chief Justice Rehnquist has
staunchly defended the closure policy as a means to the rehabilitation end, see Smith v. Daily
Mail Pubrg Co., 443 U.S. 97, 108 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring), the Court on the whole has
found only a tenuous link between closure and rehabilitation. See, e.g., Gault, 387 U.S. at 24 &
n.31, 26-27 & n.37 (citing evidence that closed proceedings and informal procedures may actually
decrease the odds of effectively rehabilitating a delinquent); MANFREDI, supranote 62, at 120-21.
90. See WATKINS, supra note 3, at 49. Watkins discusses the early goal of establishing "a
tribunal whose processes would largely avoid public scrutiny through closed-door proceedings
and the judicial sealing of juvenile records." Id.
91. See id. at 122 (C'IThecollection of a maximum amount of personal data on the child is
considered a necessary predicate for equitable judgments. Under parenspatriae, the generating
of information on a juvenile is considered part and parcel of the special obligation incurred by the
state to assure proper dispositional alternatives.").
92. See id. at 122-26 (noting, however, that many commentators question this justification
for a hidden process, especially considering recent revolutions in technology, which assist determined parties in finding the information anyway).
93. See supra Part I.A.2; see also Marygold S. Melli, Juvenile Justice Reform in Context,
1996 WIs. L. REv. 375, 390-91 (demonstrating that legislators have emphasized criminal punishment objectives in response to the public's reaction to higher offense rates and its "perception
that the increase is somehow related to the failure of the juvenile court).
94. See supraPart I.B.2.
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they are unforeseen and unintended effects, judicial abuse and systemic malfunction have often closely followed closure.9 5
Disturbingly, a juvenile judge's actual power and discretion
to "treat" youths flows from the state's police power via a statute.9 6
Indeed, it is "a function of the social contract, representing power
ceded to the government by the people to restrict the freedom of
[juveniles] for the protection of public welfare, order and security. " s
This "authoritarian nature of the [adjudication] enterprise"93 not
only undermines the assumption that the judge always acts in the
best interest of the child, 99 it also begs for some check on the farranging discretion 00 that judges exercise sight unseen in presumptive closure jurisdictions. This unchecked, unseen discretion is es-

95. See infra notes 100-09 and accompanying text.
96. See Stephen Wizner, On Youth Crime and the Juvenile Court, 36 B.C. L. REV. 1025,
1031-32 (1995) (accounting for the juvenile court's mandate) [hereinafter Wizner]; see also An.
drew Walkover, The Infancy Defense in the New Juvenile Court, 31 UCLA L REV. 503, 562
(1984) ("Non-culpable children faced with the criminal process must be protected, not by the
state, but from state ....This, in sum, is the received wisdom of the last tventy-five years of
juvenile sociological and jurisprudential study.") (emphasis added); Stephen Wizner & Mary F.
Keller, The Penal Model of Juvenile Justice: Is Juvenile Court Delinquency JurisdictionObsolete?, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1120, 1126 (1977) (repudiating "the idea that the state, in the form of the
juvenile court and under the guise of omniscient benefactor, is best able to effect social goals
relating to child development") [hereinafter Wizner & Keller].
97. Wizner, supranote 96, at 1031.
98. Id. at 1032.
99. See id. (recognizing "that when, in an authoritative setting, we attempt to do something
for a child because of what he is and what he needs,' we are also doing something to him ....
Whatever one's motivations, however elevated one's objectives, ... the measures taken result in
the compulsory loss of the child's liberty.") (quoting FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 18 (1964)).
100. See supra Part LB.1 (discussing the original need for wide judicial discretion to shape a
personalized disposition fitting the "best interest of the child"); see also Wizner & Keller, supra
note 96, at 1123 (discussing the "unbridled discretion of juvenile courts to intervene in the lives
of children and their families and to impose coercive sanctions disproportionate to the behavior
that triggered its [sic] jurisdiction"). The Supreme Court has acknowledged the juvenile judge's
wide discretion in sentencing and in waiving jurisdiction, most notably in Kent v. United States,
383 U.S. 541, 552-53 (1966) (finding that the statute at issue contemplated considerable latitude
for a judge to render treatment tailored to a particular offender's needs). Nevertheless, in reminding juvenile judges that they must comport with due process standards, the Court has
promulgated certain criteria creating boundaries on that discretion. See id. at 553, 566-67. The
criteria that govern waiver include the seriousness of the offense, the merit of the complaint, the
juvenile's history and maturity, and the prospects for rehabilitation. See id.; see also Federle,
supra note 3, at 33-34 & n.51 (discussing Kent). These criteria were codified in the Juvenile
Justice Delinquency Prevention Act ("JJDPA"). See 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1994).
Many states have also reduced judicial discretion on their own accord by promulgating statutory juvenile sentencing schemes, but these have often proven harsh. See Cynthia Conward, The
Juvenile Justice System: Not Necessarily in the Best Interests of the Children, 33 NEW ENG. L.
REv. 39, 63 (1998) (describing how statutes like California's "three-strikes" law have dramatically affected youths). Moreover, such schemes seem to indicate that many, if not most, states
have abandoned efforts to personalize dispositions in the best interest of the child.
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pecially troubling in light of empirical evidence indicating that juvenile judges often not only lack the innate ability to treat delin-

quent youths adequately, 10 1 but that some may be careless, arbi10 2
trary, or even racist in adjudication.
While unchecked judicial abuse in the juvenile process
probably owes as much to a broad delegation of authority as it does

to closure, institutional malfunction seems to be a direct effect of
closure. 10 3 Although the juvenile court's founders supposed that closure encouraged free-flow of information among the system's participants,10 4 it can actually be counterproductive, impeding adjudication by causing "misinformation and delay." 10 5 Adjudications may
be postponed because juvenile information agencies sometimes balk
at sharing confidential information. 0 6 At its worst, closure "handicap[s] the authorities and endanger[s] the community" by preventing information exchange between juvenile and adult law enforce-

ment agencies. 10 7 This information is vital in today's legislative

101. See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 544 & n.4 (1971). The McKeiver
Court cited a Presidents Commission Task Force Report, which indicated to the Court that "the
juvenile court judge falls far short of that stalwart, protective, and communicating figure the
system envisaged." Id. at 544.
102. See Donna M. Bishop & Charles E. Frazier, Race Effects in Juvenile JusticeDecision.
making: Findings of a Statewide Analysis, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 392, 405 (1996) (concluding from a quantitative analysis of Florida's juvenile system that there are "clear disadvan.
tages for nonwhites at multiple stages in delinquency case processing. While the magnitude of
the race effect varies from stage to stage, there is a consistent pattern of unequal treatment.");
Podkopacz & Feld, An Empirical Study of Judicial Waiver, supra note 4, at 453 (concluding,
based on an in-depth statistical analysis, that "[tihe subjective nature of waiver decisions allows
unequal application of the law to similarly situated youths without any effective check. Juvenile
courts cannot administer these discretionary statutes on a consistent, even-handed basis.");
Robert J. Sampson & John H. Laub, StructuralVariations in Juvenile Court Processing Inequality, the Underclass,and Social Control, 27 LAW & SOCY REV. 285, 293 (1993) (arguing that po.
litical leaders have used juvenile courts to keep members of the underclass under "social controt'); Sanborn, supra note 9, at 235 C"Judges have been found to be biased against juveniles
because they had discovered the defendants record before trial, remembered the youth from
previous crimes or from previous hearings for the current offense, or learned the child had been
held in detention.").
103. See generally Jan L. Trasen, Note, Privacy v. Public Access to Juvenile Court Proceedings: Do Closed HearingsProtectthe Child or the System?, 15 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 359 (1995)
(concluding that closed hearings protect the system, not the child).
104. See WATKINS, supra note 3, at 122 (stating that "[tihe confidentiality concept was advanced to foster a complete and unfettered information flow among and between the juvenile,
and the court and probation staff').
105. Trasen, supra note 103, at 380 (demonstrating that sealing of records and closure have
fostered anything but unfettered information flow).
106. See Martin, Open the Doors, supra note 9, at 407 (describing one case in which "[i]t took
a court order to the agencies involved to convene... [and] break the gridlock").
107. Trasen, supra note 103, at 380.
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schemes, because transfer from the juvenile system to the adult
system is occurring with increasing frequency.108
These problems, as well as the transformations outlined earher in this Part, have led some commentators to recommend abandoning closure-or even the entire juvenile system-as a matter of
policy. 10 9 In contrast, the next Part turns its attention to some of
the constitutional implications of these developments.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE: THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS CLAIM
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o State shall
..deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due proc-

ess of law."110 The Due Process Clause, of course, incorporates many
of the original Bill of Rights' provisions as protections against state
action. 1 Thus, the press's First Amendment claim and the juvenile's Sixth Amendment claim against the state-enacted presumptive closure statutes are, structurally, Fourteenth Amendment
claims.112
Section A outlines the First Amendment and Sixth Amendment challenges to presumptive closure statutes. Illustrating that,

108. The 1980s and 1990s brought waiver figures to unprecedented highs, especially because
of new "prosecutorial waiver" mechanisms. See Feld, Race and the 'Crac Down" on Youth
Crime, supra note 3, at 358-59, 369 (noting that the "rate of judicial waiver increased 68% between 1988 and 1992," observing that forty-seven states since 1992 have enacted tougher transfer laws, and suggesting that this recent "tidal wave of law reforms ...disproportionately affects
young black men").
109. See supra note 3 (enumerating a number of scholars' works proposing abolition because
of these problems).

110. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
111. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS xiv (1998) (describing incorporation's "three
main approaches-Hugo Black's 'total incorporation' theory, William Brennan's 'selective incorporation! model, and Felix Frankfurter's 'fundamental fairness' doctrine") [hereinafter AMAR,
THE BILL OF RIGHTS].
112. Structurally speaking, the press would challenge a closure statute as a deprivation of its
"liberty" of First Amendment access to delinquency proceedings. See GERALD GurHER &
KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 454 (13th ed. 1997) (describing substantive due
process generally, and noting that "the term 'liberty' is... the major basis of the Court's active
enforcement of personal rights today... [including] the 'specific' First Amendment guarantees of
freedom of speech, press and religion long 'incorporated' into the 14th Amendment").
A juvenile would challenge a closure statute as a deprivation of his "liberty"-freedom from
incarceration-without the proper procedures. That is, he would charge that a public trial, by its
very enumeration in the Sixth Amendment, is essential to an accurate determination of whether,
and for how long, he should be incarcerated (or whether he should be waived into the adult
criminal court system). See id. at 432-34 (discussing "due" criminal procedures and the structural debate over the Bill of Rights' criminal protections' incorporation into the Due Process
Clause).
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in light of current Supreme Court precedent, the statutes may well
pass constitutional muster under these incorporated protections, it
introduces an alternative but related freestanding due process
challenge, which is explicated in Section B. This Part concludes by
demonstrating that the closure statutes are unconstitutional under
the Due Process Clause and the Court's accompanying "fundamental fairness" jurisprudence.
A. FailedAttempts: Rejecting Two IncorporatedProtections in the
Juvenile Context
1. The Press's First Amendment Claim
The First Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press ....-113 While the First Amendment freedom of the press
is incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment as a check on state
governments, 1 4 that restriction has traditionally been more vigorous in protecting the press's dissemination of information lawfully
obtained 15 than in protecting the obtainment itself.116 Thus, states
enacting statutes that presumptively close court proceedings may
be able to deprive the press of its access to a courtroom without
violating the First Amendment. That is, if access to court proceedings is not found to be within the freedom of the press, its curtailment by presumptive or mandatory closure statutes will likely pass
constitutional muster. 117

113. U.S. CONST. amend. I.

114. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931) CIt is no longer open to doubt that the
liberty of the press, and of speech, is within the liberty safeguarded by the [D]ue [P]rocess
[Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by state action."); see also Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 603 (1982) C'[The] right of access is embodied in the

First Amendment, and applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.").
115. See Potter Stewart, Address, Or of the Press,26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 636 (1975) (indicat-

ing that "the autonomous press may publish what it knows").
116. See id. (acknowledging that the media "may seek to learn what it can," but remarking
that the "Constitution itself is neither a Freedom of Information Act nor an Official Secrets Act").
But see William J. Brennan, Jr., Address, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 173, 177 (1979) (stating that,
under the "structural moder' of press freedom, "[t]he press is not only shielded when it speaks

out, but when it performs all the myriad tasks necessary for it to gather and disseminate the
news"); Note, The Right of the Press to GatherInformation, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 838, 864 (1971)
(concluding that courts should interpret the freedom of the press "to include protection for essen-

tial and unique functions of the information media, especially the gathering of information").
117. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (applying extremely deferential 'rational basis' scrutiny to a state regulation prohibiting homosexual sex, a personal liberty not
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The central issues thus become, first, the constitutional
status of press access to courts, and second, in accordance with that
status, the level of scrutiny a court will apply to statutes presumptively closing court proceedings. The Supreme Court addressed
these two questions respectively in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia18 and Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court.129
In Richmond Newspapers, a 7-1 decision with seven opinions
and no majority, 120 the Court held that press access to criminal proceedings does receive at least some level of First Amendment protection, and that its curtailment by the state would thus be restricted by Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process. Writing for the plurality, 121 Chief Justice Burger declared:
Free speech carries with it some freedom to listen ....
What this means in the
context of trials is that the First Amendment guarantees of free speech and press,
standing alone, prohibit government from summarily closing courtroom doors
which had long been open to the public at the time that Amendment was
adopted. 22

The plurality acknowledged the obvious argument that "the
Constitution nowhere spells out a guarantee for the right of the
public to attend trials." 12 3 Nevertheless, it viewed access as a necessary corollary to the enjoyment of the more established freedoms of
speech, press, and assembly. 124 It reasoned that those enumerated
liberties "would lose much meaning," and that purposeful discussion of the criminal system would come to a standstill, if "access to
observe the trial could.., be foreclosed arbitrarily."125

listed in the text of the Constitution); cf. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483,
487 (1955) (applying extremely deferential 'rational basis' scrutiny to an economic regulation,
finding that "it is for the legislature, not the courts, to balance the advantages and disadvantages" of those laws affecting unlisted economic liberties).
Nonetheless, the freedom to gather news at court proceedings may garner more vigorous constitutional protection than other newsgathering in general because "the information is released
in a forum .. . not wholly internal to the government." LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AM4ERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-20 at 955 (2d ed. 1988).
118. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
119. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
120. For a complete discussion of the Court's opinions, see generally The Supreme Court,
1979 Term-Leading Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 149 (1980).
121. Chief Justice Burger's judgment was joined by Justices White and Stevens. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 558.
122. Id. at 576. The plurality also recognized a First Amendment right to "receive information and ideas." Id. (quoting Kleindeinst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972)).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 579 (recognizing that "important but unarticulated rights have... been found to
share constitutional protection in common with [such] explicit guarantees").
125. Id. at 577; see also The Supreme Court, 1979 Term-Leading Cases, supra note 120, at
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The plurality also analyzed the adult criminal proceeding's
"uncontradicted history," which indicated that "openness inheres in
126
the very nature of a criminal trial under our system of justice."
Upon reviewing an array of historical and philosophical sources
emphasizing the trial's public nature, 127 it found ample evidence to
support the newspaper's claim that access "contribute[s] to public
understanding of the rule of law and to comprehension of the functioning of the entire criminal justice system." 12 Concurring, Justice
Brennan agreed with the plurality on this point, stressing the long
tradition of open criminal proceedings. 129 Justice Brennan declared
that "the case for a right of access has special force when drawn
from an enduring and vital tradition of public entree . . .because
13 0
the Constitution carries the gloss of history."
Two years later, the Court in Globe Newspaper131 continued
its line of reasoning from Richmond Newspapers, holding that it
would apply strict scrutiny to any statute presumptively closing
criminal trials. 32 In striking down a Massachusetts statute requiring the press's exclusion from a criminal proceeding during a
minor victim's testimony, the Court solidified the scattered opinions
of Richmond Newspapers. 33 It held that, to justify statutorily excluding the press from such trials, the state must show that denial
of access "is necessitated by a compelling governmental interest,
13 4
and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest."

126. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 573.

127. Id. at 565-73 & nn.5-8. Among other sources, the Court relied heavily on numerous
early English cases and well-known English scholars, including Holdsworth, Lord Coke, Sir
Frederick Pollock, and Jeremy Bentham. Id.
128. Id. at 573 (citing Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 587 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in the judgment)).
129. Id. at 589-93 (Brennan, J., concurring) (concluding that "[t]radition, contemporaneous
state practice, and this Court's own decisions manifest a common understanding that (a] trial is
a public event") (quoting Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947)). Justice Brennan's concur-

rence, joined by Justice Marshall, contained a two-part "experience and logic" test, the strand of
reasoning upon which the Court has since most heavily relied. See generally Dalton, supra note
15 (describing Justice Brennan's framework and its development over a string of the Court's
access decisions, and applying it to juvenile delinquency proceedings).

130. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
131. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982).

132. Id. at 606-07 (holding that "the State's justification in denying access must be a weighty
one").

133. Id. at 602 (reversing the lower court's judgment by finding that the Massachusetts
mandatory closure rule was unconstitutional under the First Amendment). This time there was
a majority opinion, written by Justice Brennan, who was joined by four other justices. Justice
O'Connor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Id. at 611. Chief Justice Burger filed a
dissent in which Justice Rehnquist joined. Id. at 612. Justice Stevens filed a separate dissent on
the ground ofmootness, accusing the Court of writing an advisory opinion. Id. at 620-21.
134. Id. at 606.
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Noting that "the right of access to criminal trials plays a particularly significant role in the functioning of the judicial process
and the government as a whole," 136 the Court found that Massachu-

setts' statutory justifications for closure failed the second prong of
the compelling interest test. 136 In holding that the Massachusetts

law was not "a narrowly tailored means of accommodating the
State's asserted interest,"137 it hinted that any statute providing
blanket denial of access in criminal cases would fail this prong because a "court can [better] determine on a case-by-case basis
whether closure is necessary .... If the trial court had been per-

mitted to exercise its discretion, closure might well have been
13 8
deemed unnecessary."

Justice O'Connor's concurrence emphasized that the constitutional status of access "rests upon our long history of open criminal trials and the special value, for both public and accused, of that
openness." 13 9 She interpreted neither Richmond Newspapers nor
Globe Newspaper "to carry any implications outside the context of

criminal trials."' 4o Her desire to write separately is notable; while

14
some courts and commentators have not adhered to her warnings, 1
her concurrence may reveal that the Court will refuse to extend
Richmond Newspapers and Globe Newspaper beyond their original

criminal scope. 142 Indeed, the Court has not yet made any such extension.

135. Id.
136. Id. at 608-09.
137. Id. at 609.
138. Id. at 608-09.
139. Id. at 611 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
140. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
141. In his well-known treatise, Professor Tribe contends that the Richmond Newspapers
and Globe Newspaper opinions stand for the proposition that the government "must, even at
some inconvenience to its courts ... let the press and the public enter its courtrooms to observe a
kind of drama-a forum for watching and listening, rather than a forum for speech. TRIBE,
supra note 117, § 12-20 at 965 (emphasis in original). Tribe, who represented Richmond Newspapers, Inc., in the Supreme Court case, believes that the justices' approaches suggest that most
of the Courts members stand ready to extend access beyond the criminal sphere to civil trials.
See id. § 12-20 at 962 & nn.55-56. Some courts have made that leap already. See, eg., Publicker
Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1067-71 (3d Cir. 1984); Brown & Williamsoa Tobacco Corp.
v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1177-79 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984). Indeed, the
California Supreme Court recently read Richmond Newspapers and Globe Newspaper this way.
See NBC Subsidiary, Inc. v. Superior Court, 980 P.2d 337, 351-60 (Cal. 1999). In discussing both
cases at length, that court "confirm[ed] the existence and scope of a First Amendment right of
access" to civil proceedings in general Id. at 365-67 (applying Justice Brennan's "logic" and
"experience" framework).
142. Cf. EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE RISE, FALL, AND FU7 URE OF THE
MODERN SUPREME COURT 515-16 (1999). In a controversial "insider's" account of the Court,
Lazarus-who clerked for Justice Blackmun during the 1988 Term-points out that Justice
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If lower courts adhere to Justice O'Connor's Globe Newspaper concurrence, it will probably be fatal to the press's First
Amendment case against the presumptive closure statutes. The
Court has held that juvenile proceedings are not "criminal prosecutions" for purposes of the Sixth Amendment,148 indicating that they
are probably not criminal trials for purposes of the First. 144 More
importantly, unlike criminal proceedings, juvenile proceedings have
not benefited from "an enduring and vital tradition of public entree."'14 True, the plurality's observation in Richmond Newspapers
that the criminal courts "had long been open to the public at the
time [the First] Amendment was adopted ' 146 applies not only to

criminal trials but to delinquency proceedings as well. When the
Amendment was adopted in 1791, an independent juvenile system
did not yet exist. 147 Trials involving youths, just as those involving
adults, were open to the public and press. 148 Nonetheless, notwithstanding recent legislation to the contrary, the longstanding tradi-

tion since the juvenile court's founding in 1899, for better or worse,
has been closure for the prevention of stigmatization.149 A press entity seeking to challenge the presumptive closure statutes on First

O'Connor, along with Justice Kennedy, often holds the "swing-vote" on major constitutional
issues dividing the justices. Id. at ix-x; see also STEPHEN E. GOTTLIEB, MORALITY IMPOSED: THE
REHNQUIST COURT AND LIBERTY IN AMERICA 106-08 (2000) (describing how Justices O'Connor
and Kennedy have largely determined the Rehnquist Courts path on a number of significant
constitutional issues); cf. Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 525 (2000) (per curiam).
143. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 541 (1971). For discussion of this aspect of
McKeiver, see infra Part II.A.2.
144. Still, the importance of distinguishing the juvenile's potential Sixth Amendment right to
a public trial and the press's (or public's) potential First Amendment right of access to proceedings cannot be overstated. See Note, Trial Secrecy and the First Amendment Right of Public
Access to JudicialProceedings,91 HARV. L. REV. 1899, 1901-04 (1978) (clarifying this distinction
because "discussions of public access to criminal trials readily become intertwined and confused
with questions pertaining to the defendants [S]ixth [A]mendment right a public triar) [hereinafter Note, Trial Secrecy].
145.-Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 589 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring).
146. Id.at 576 (plurality opinion).
147. See Fox, supra note 3, at 1187 (showing a lack of major legislation regarding "the means
for dealing with juvenile deviants" until at least 1825). The system as we know it today was not
conceived until 1899. See generally id. (providing an oft-cited historical analysis of the juvenile
system's development).
148. See Dalton, supra note 15, at 1201 ("[1]t
is undisputed that any juvenile accused of
breaking a criminal law was tried in an open, adult criminal trial at the time our organic laws
were adopted and the Constitution ratified.") (citing HERBERT H. LOU, JUVENILE COURTS IN THE
UNITED STATES 13-14 (1927) (discussing the colonial practice of hanging juveniles as young as
eight years old)); see generally Fox, supranote 3, at 1187-1221 (describing pre-1899 youth justice,
and noting that proceedings were generally held in public even though the juvenile only had a
"right" to a public hearing in serious cases).
149. See WATKINS, supra note 3, at 49; Mack, supra note 30, at 115.
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Amendment Richmond Newspapers and Globe Newspaper grounds,
therefore, should not be overly optimistic that the Court vill apply
those cases, or their accompanying constitutional scrutiny, to the
statutes.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the Court does apply Globe Newspaper's compelling interest scrutiny to statutes
closing juvenile proceedings, 150 the statutes may still pass the
test. 151 Admittedly, rehabilitation,1 52 the interest that states have
repeatedly and exclusively offered as justification for closure, 1 5 has
fallen short of original expectations. 154 The juvenile court's systemic
lack of resources has often landed juvenile offenders in institutions
no more rehabilitative than adult prisons. 15 5 Considering the strin150. Dalton applies the "experience and logic" test of the Richmond Newspapers line of cases
to juvenile proceedings, and convincingly argues that the application should trigger the constitutional scrutiny of the Court. See generally Dalton, supra note 15. The title of this Section is not
meant to suggest that his argument is nothing more than a "failed attempt." On the whole, his
conclusion is convincing. Importantly, however, the Court has not yet extended, and may never
extend, the Richmond Newspapers cases beyond the criminal sphere. Therefore, even if his argument succeeds in some states as a matter of state constitutional law, ef. Jay S. Bybee, Common Ground: Robert Jackson, Antonin Scalia, and a Power Theory of the FirstAmendment, 75
TUL. L. REV. 251, 315 (2000) (suggesting that the Framers "did not conceive of the United States
Constitution as the ultimate means of guaranteeing... political and personal [freedoms because]
[t]hat function was served by other charters and documents-most importantly state constitutions... .") (footnote omitted), it may not succeed in the Supreme Court, especially in light of
Justice O'Connor's Globe Newspaper concurrence and the McKeier holding that juvenile proceedings are not "criminal prosecutions." Thus, this Note puts forth an alternative due process
argument, see infra Part II.B, to bypass this potential roadblock.
151. Once again, Dalton argues that closure will fail the compelling interest test, and, once
again, his analysis to that effect is largely convincing. Nonetheless, this Note does not assume
that presumptive closure statutes will fail the First Amendment test, especially because the
Court has found rehabilitation compelling before. See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S.
528, 547 (1971).
It should be recognized either way that the press's interest in access to delinquency proceedings has probably never been more "proper" or "direct" under the text and meaning of the presumptive closure statutes than it is now, because of the transformation of the juvenile court into
a more punitive mechanism. See supra Part I.A.2; Sanborn, supra note 9, at 236-37 (emphasizing the "need for safeguards" in today's juvenile court, including publicity, because of judicial
bias and the increasing tendency of severely punishing youths). One juvenile judge also adds
that the press has a positive role to play in "rebuilding trust and dissipating the fear" that the
public feels now more than ever as a result of both increasing youth crime rates and the closed
juvenile system. Martin, Open the Doors, supra note 9, at 394-95. This judge's conclusion gives
one hope that, even if the statutes pass constitutional muster, juvenile judges wvill find a "direct"
or "proper" interest on behalf of the press more frequently than they have in the past.
152. For an extensive review of the general rehabilitation theory and its development over
time, see generally RYERSON, supra note 3.
153. See Dalton, supra note 15, at 1222 & n.415 (describing the "automaton-like recitation of
rehabilitation as the driving force behind confidentiality statutes" and listing a number of state
supreme court cases wherein the state articulated no other interest).
154. See supraPart LA.
155. See SHAY BILcHICi, A JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 1 (1998) (asserting that the juvenile system has not been able to handle "the challenge presented during the
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gency of the compelling interest test, 116 many states could be hardpressed to empirically justify dispensing with the press's (heretofore unrecognized) constitutional right of access in the name of rehabilitation. 157 Nevertheless, even though it now shares its priority
status with punitive goals, 158 rehabilitation is not an entirely useless or unrealistic ideal. 159 Its failure to live up to expectations does
not necessarily mean that the Supreme Court would not find it
"compelling" under the Globe Newspaper test. The Court has recognized the severity of rehabilitation's shortcomings, yet has simultaneously refused to hold "that the system cannot accomplish its rehabilitative goals."'160 It has therefore found rehabilitation a worthy
aim that, apparently, holds sufficient promise of success in the future. 161
If the state's interest in rehabilitation is compelling-and it

may well be-the presumptive closure statutes must still face the
stringent narrow tailoring requirement established in Globe Newspaper.162 There, the Court struck down the Massachusetts statute
even though it pursued the compelling governmental objective of
protecting young rape victims from public embarrassment. 163 The
statute failed the Court's scrutiny because it did not enact the least
16 4
invasive infringement on the press's right of access.

past decade," and has been especially unable to "meet the treatment and rehabilitation needs of
each juvenile offender"); see also Dalton, supra note 15, at 1182-87 (demonstrating that the juvenile system is hopelessly failing in treatment, and that its condition is "only likely to get worse in
the future"). Dalton observes that, "in spite of one-hundred years of rhetoric, juveniles are either
placed in 'jail-like' detention homes or jail itself." Id. at 1187 (citing SOL RUBIN, LAW OF
JUVENILE JUSTICE 16-18 (1976)).
156. Compelling interest scrutiny, more often than not, is fatal to the state. See Stephen E.
Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An Essential But Unanalyzed Term in Consttlu
tional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REV. 917, 918-19 (1988) (finding a "dearth of commentary" on the
standard because of the Courts "lack of analysis" and cavalier dismissals of compelling govern.
mental interests).
157. See Dalton, supra note 15, at 1225 (arguing that "generic fears of diminished rehabilitation... are likely insufficient to justify closing juvenile courts").
158. See Ross, supra note 37, at 1040-41 ('The post-Gault juvenile court is characterized by
unresolved conflicts between the urge to allow judicial discretion where it serves the purposes of
rehabilitation and demands for procedural protections; between the rehabilitative goal and societal demands for retribution; and between idealistic hopes and realistic disappointments."); Shef.
fer, supra note 34, at 482-84 (demonstrating that the system expends as much energy on punishment as it does on rehabilitation).
159. See Martin, Is There Still a Place for Rehabilitation?,supra note 24, at 64 (concluding
that rehabilitation is still attainable on some scale).
160. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 547 (1971).
161. Id.
162. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 608-09 (1982).
163. Id. at 608.
164. Id.
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Statutes presumptively closing delinquency proceedings are
arguably unconstitutional as well, because alternative methods of
rehabilitation may be constitutionally less invasive than excluding
the press from the courtroom. As many states have done, presumptive closure jurisdictions could enact legislation providing for presumptively open proceedings, 165 or for open proceedings in the most
serious cases. 66 Such legislation would reduce the hazard of judicial
abuse 167 because, with a baseline of openness, juvenile judges would
have to publicly account for the reasoning underlying their closure
of hearings. Arbitrary transfers to adult court would be difficult to
justify, thus reducing careless decision-making. 168 Such reforms
would appear to be more narrowly tailored than presumptive closure schemes, because they serve the treatment of youths yet still
give the press access to more proceedings and require enumeration
of particular ways in which closure serves the rehabilitation end.
Under some states' recent legislation, for example, judges can only
deny access where publicity impedes rehabilitation. 169
Even after considering all of this, however, a cautious reading of Globe Newspaper counsels against whole-heartedly subscribing to the First Amendment argument against the presumptive closure statutes. Alternative legislative measures are indeed more
palatable than closure statutes as a policy matter, but most of the
closure statutes do not provide for the same type of blanket exclu-

165. See ARIZ. Juv. Or. R. 7(c)(3) (West 1997 & Supp. 2000); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-1106(2) (West 1997 & Supp. 2000); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.205 (West 1996 & Supp. 2001); IND.
CODE ANN. § 31-32-6-2 (Michie 1997); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.39 (West 2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
38-1652 (2000); MCI. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.17(7) (West 1993 & Supp. 2000); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 62.193(1) (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1999); N.L STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-16(B) (Michie
1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-801(a) (1999); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.08(a) (Vernon 1996 &
Supp. 2001); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.140(6) (West 1993 & Supp. 2001); sce also supra
note 13 (enumerating all fifty-one jurisdictions' access statutes).
166. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 676(a)(1)-(28) (Vest 1998 & Supp. 2001); DEL CODE
ANN. tit 10 § 1063(a) (1999); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-78(b)(1) (Supp. 2000); HAW. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 571-41(b), 571-84.6(c) (Michie 1999); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. Ch.C, art. 879(B) (West 1995
& Supp. 2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 3307(2) (West 1980 & Supp. 2000); MD. CODE
ANN., OrS & JUD. PROC. § 3-812(f) (1995 & Lexis Supp. 2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260B.163(c)
(West 1998 & Supp. 2001); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.171(6) (West 1996 & Supp. 2001); ND. CEr.
CODE § 27-20-24(5) (1991 & Lexis Supp. 1999); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 § 73034.2(A) (West
1998); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6336(e) (West 2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-7A-36 (Michie
1999); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-115(1)(b)-(c) (1996 & Le.xis Supp. 2000); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1302 (Michie 1999); see also supra note 13 (enumerating all fifty-one jurisdictions' access statutes).
167. For a brief review of juvenile judges' wide discretion and the resulting potential for
abuse, see supra notes 62-64, 95-102, infra notes 249-85, and accompanying text.
168. See generally Sanborn, supra note 9 (arguing that publicity provides for judicial accountability and encourages diligence on the part of juvenile officials).
169. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.39 (West 2000).
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sion included in the Massachusetts statute at issue in Globe Newspaper. With the exception of Connecticut and New Hampshire,
which mandate exclusion regardless of the circumstances, 170 the
closure jurisdictions give the juvenile judge discretion to allow into
the courtroom those persons with a "direct" or "proper" interest in
the matter. 171 Such persons might include members of the press,
especially in very serious or high-profile cases. In any event, as the
Globe Newspaper Court recognized, the judge "can [best] determine
on a case-by-case basis whether closure is necessary ....If the trial

court [is] permitted to exercise its discretion, closure might well
172
[be] deemed unnecessary."'
The outcome of the First Amendment challenge to closure
statutes remains unclear, making it all the more necessary to parse
the Constitution for other provisions under which the statutes
might be held invalid. The next logical stop is the Sixth Amendment.

170. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-76(h) (West 1994); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §169-B:34(W)(a)
(1994 & Lexis Supp. 2000); see also supranote 13 (enumerating all fifty-one jurisdictions' access
statutes). These two statutes are the most invasive of the press's potential First Amendment
right of access to juvenile proceedings, and if Globe Newspaper scrutiny were applied to them,
they would be the most likely candidates to fail the test because they do not appear to be "narrowly tailored." Either way, the conclusion that presumptive closure statutes violate the Duo
Process Clause, see infra Part II.B, obviously applies to these two rather draconian statutes.
171. The presumptive closure statutes are all surprisingly similar in this way; almost all of
them use the "direct interest" or "proper interest' language. See ALA. CODE § 12-15-65(a) (1995
& Lexis Supp. 2000); ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.070(a) (Michie 2000); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2316(o)
(1997 & Lexis Supp. 2000); IDAHO CODE § 16-1608(b) (Michie 1979 & Supp. 2000); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 610.070(3) (Michie 1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 65 (West 1993 & Supp. 2000);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-203(6) (2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-60 (i) (West 1987 & Supp.
2000); N.Y. JUD. CT. ACTS § 341.1 (McKinney 1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.35(A) (West

Supp. 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-30 (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-755 (Law. Co-op. 1985 &
West Supp. 2000); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-124(d) (1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5523(c) (1991
& Lexis Supp. 1999); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-2(i) (Mdichie 1999 & Lexis Supp. 2000); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 48.299(1)(a) (West 1997 & Supp. 2000); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14.6-224(b) (Michie 1999); see
also supranote 13 (enumerating all fifty-one jurisdictions' access statutes).
172. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 608-09 (1982). Of course, the
judge may well abuse this discretion, and the press's constitutional interest in access, no doubt,
is thereby infringed. The abuse of discretion concern, however, is better argued from the juvenile's perspective, under the auspices of a due process claim, because his constitutional interest
in freedom from incarceration seems weightier than the press's access interest. Indeed, the
primary justification for press access in the first place is to vindicate the juveniles interest. It
seems more logical to vindicate that interest directly through the Fourteenth Amendment's independent procedural content rather than indirectly through its incorporation of the First
Amendment.
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2. The Juvenile's Sixth Amendment Claim
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
In all criminalprosecutions,the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury... and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defence. 73

If the argument succeeds that juvenile proceedings are "criminal
prosecutions," an accused youth would benefit not only from the
Sixth Amendment's array of criminal safeguards, but he would
174 as well. 175
likely benefit from the Fifth Amendment's protections
The Supreme Court's application of substantial portions of those
amendments to juvenile proceedings might, at first blush, appear to
render the "criminal prosecution" argument academic. Indeed, after
Gault, Winship, and Breed, juveniles are already entitled to most of
the criminal protections enumerated in the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments, including notice of charges, assistance of counsel,
confrontation of witnesses, the privilege against self-incrimination,
and protection from double jeopardy. 176 The argument becomes
much more significant, however, in the context of presumptive closure statutes; were a juvenile's "prosecution" taking place behind
closed doors, he could persuasively claim that the state was denying
his Sixth Amendment "right to a ... public trial."177 And, were it

173. U.S. CONSr. amend. VI (emphasis added). The Sixth Amendments protections have
been incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause as restrictions on state
government action. See, eg., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S.
400 (1965); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
174. The Fifth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that
[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury... nor shall any person
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself....
U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendments protections have been incorporated into the
Fourteenth Amendmenes Due Process Clause as restrictions on state government action. See,
e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
175. This conclusion follows from the Supreme Court's long-standing rule that a "criminal
prosecution under [the Sixth Amendment] is much narrower than a criminal case under [the
Fifth Amendment]." Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 663 (1891). Thus, if a juvenile
proceeding did indeed qualify as a."criminal prosecution" for purposes of the Sixth Amendment,
it would logically follow that it would easily qualify as a "criminal case" for purposes of the Fifth
Amendment as well.
176. See supra Part LB.2.
177. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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78 this argument would be a comnot for McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,1
pelling and dispositive one.
In McKeiver-decided just one year after the stronglyworded Winship decision-a plurality of the Supreme Court took an
aberrant but momentous detour from its "constitutional domestication" 79 of the juvenile court system. Though it again acknowledged
the system's punitive nature and its due process failings, 180 the
Court retreated from its stance in Gault and Winship by refusing to
181
apply the Sixth Amendment right to trial "by an impartial jury"'
182
to juvenile courts.
While the plurality conceded that there were extensive sys-

temic shortcomings justifying such a right, 183 it was "reluctant to

say that, despite disappointments of grave dimensions, [the system]
still does not hold promise . . [or] that [it] cannot accomplish its
rehabilitative goals."'184 Upon examining the language of Gault and
Winship, the plurality found that "the juvenile proceeding has not
yet been held to be a 'criminal prosecution,' within the meaning and
reach of the Sixth Amendment." 85 Justice Brennan agreed "with
the plurality's conclusion that the proceedings below in these cases
were not 'criminal prosecutions' " for the Sixth Amendment's purposes, 186 bringing the total on that issue to a five-justice majority,

178. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971). Five opinions were filed in McKeiver;
Justice Blackmun delivered the judgment of the Court in a plurality opinion, in which Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and White joined. Id. at 530. Justice White filed a concurring opinion, id. at 551, Justice Brennan filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in

part, id. at 553, and Justice Harlan filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, id. at 557.
Justice Douglas' dissent was joined by Justices Black and Marshall. Id. at 558.
179. Professor Paulsen coined this term to describe the Gault Court's constitutional formal.
ization of juvenile court procedures. See generallyPaulsen, supra note 77.
180. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 544 n.5 (affirming Gault's emphasis on the due process require.
ments of notice, counsel, confrontation and cross examination, especially because the juvenile
court "labels truants and runaways as junior criminals").
181. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
182. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 545.
183. Id. The plurality found the Gault requirements essential to accurate fact-finding, yet
simultaneously saw a jury as dispensable. Id. at 543. For the argument that a jury trial is es.
sential in today's juvenile proceedings, see generally Sanborn, supra note 9.
184. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 547.
185. Id. at 541.
186. Id. at 553 (Brennan, J.). Justice Harlan's opinion was more ambiguous on the issue;
while he seemed to find some merit in the suggestion "that juvenile delinquency proceedings
have in practice actually become in many, if not all, respects criminal trials," he apparently rejected it, but not explicitly. Id. at 557 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Douglas's dissent was clearer. Joined by Justices Black and Marshall, Justice Douglas emphasized
the Courts holding in Gault, the fact that punishment for youth and adults is often the same,
and that the Constitution "speaks of denial of rights to 'any person,' not denial of rights to 'any
adult person.' " Id. at 559-60 (Douglas, J., dissenting). He therefore would have found delin-
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and textually short-circuiting a juvenile's Sixth Amendment public
trial claim against presumptive closure statutes.
To be sure, juvenile proceedings have changed substantially
since the 1971 McKeiver ruling,18 7 and numerous observers contend
that they are now essentially criminal in nature. 188 Indeed, after
the Gault revolution and substantive changes in state legislation,
juvenile courts function much more like their criminal counterparts
than they have since their establishment in 1899, and they have
become far more punitive as well. 189 The splintered "criminal prosecution" ruling in McKeiver garnered only five votes.19 0 The Court's
other juvenile decisions from the McKeiver period cast some doubt
on the holding. The Gault Court refused to "disregard substance
because of the feeble enticement of the 'civil' label-of-convenience
which has been attached to juvenile proceedings." 191 Four years after McKeiver, the Breed Court implicitly called into question that
case's Sixth Amendment ruling by applying the Double Jeopardy
Clause to juvenile proceedings 192 after recognizing that "the risk to
which the Clause refers is not present in proceedings that are not
93
essentially criminal."
Nonetheless, the Gault and Breed rulings, convincing and
powerful as they are, are not binding precedent on the Sixth
Amendment issue.' 94 On the other hand, McKeiver, outdated and

quency proceedings to be criminal prosecutions for Sixth Amendment purposes. Id, at 557-63
(arguing that the distinction between "criminal" and "juvenile" is senseless). For a concise synopsis of the justices' scattered McKeiver opinions and approaches, see generally The Supreme
Court, 1970 Term-Leading Cases, 85 HARV. L REV. 113 (1971).
187. See supranote 4 and accompanying text; supraPart LA.2.
188. Feld, Race and the "CrackDown" on Youth Crime, supra note 3,at 328 & n.4 (Within
the past three decades, judicial decisions, legislative amendments, and administrative changes
have transformed the juvenile court from a nominally rehabilitative social welfare agency into a
scaled-down, second-class criminal court for young offenders that provides neither therapy nor
justice."); Thomas F. Geraghty, Justice For Children: How Do We Get There?, 88 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIINOLOGY 190, 191 (1998) ("I see daily the tragic impact of the criminalization of the juvenile
court and referral of my clients to criminal court and believe that this trend does not serve victims or society at large."). See generally Ainsworth, Youth Justice ina Unified Court, supra note
3 (recommending that the juvenile court be merged into the criminal system because its idealistic "civil" goals have not been attained).
189. See supraPart I.A.2.
190. See supra notes 178-86 and accompanying text.
191. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 50 (1967).
192. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 529-30 (1975).
193. Id. at 528 (quoting Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 398 (1938)).
194. Gault and Winship were decided explicitly and exclusively on Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process grounds. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 359 (1970) C'This case presents the single.
narrow question whether proof beyond a reasonable doubt is among the 'essentials of due process
and fair treatment' required during the adjudicatory stage when a juvenile is charged with an
act which would constitute a crime if committed by an adult.") (citing Gault, 387 U.S. at 13);
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questionable as it may be, could not be more on-point or explicit:
"[Tihe juvenile court proceeding has not yet been held to be a
'criminal prosecution,' within the meaning and reach of the Sixth

Amendment." 195 While the "not yet" language seems to leave the
Sixth Amendment door ajar, it remains that a public trial claim
against presumptive closure statutes cannot succeed without a fullscale reversal of McKeiver and, therefore, an extension of a jury
trial to all delinquency proceedings. 196 The argument can be-and
has been-made that the transformation of the juvenile court over
the past thirty years justifies such a reversal. 197 Still, that argument has not succeeded. If the doctrine of stare decicis' 98 is not sufficient on its own to uphold McKeiver, the fact that the Court was
unwilling in 1971 to impose upon states the costs associated with

Gault, 387 U.S. at 41 (extending juveniles the right to assistance of counsel because "the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires [it when] the juvenile's freedom is curtailed"). More obviously, Breed was decided explicitly and exclusively on Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment grounds. Breed, 421 U.S. at 528-31 (applying the protection against double jeopardy
to juvenile proceedings). None of these rulings even marginally rested upon any provision of the
Sixth Amendment.
195. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 541.
196. Recall the language of the Sixth Amendment: 'In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury ..
" U.S. CONST. amend.
VI. Textually, the "speedy... trial," "public trial," and "impartial jury" requirements appear
inextricably bound to one another. That is, any "criminal prosecution" will simultaneously trigger all three entitlements, and cannot possibly trigger less than all three; reading this clause any
other way would seem to defy verbal logic and convention. Hence, even though the McKeiver
Court was solely concerned with the jury trial requirement, see generallyMcKeiver, 403 U.S. 528,
its ruling, at least on the Sixth Amendment front, is preclusive of a public trial as well. This is
one major reason why the Fourteenth Amendment takes on added significance in the presumptive closure context; the Due Process Clause does not inseparably link a "public trial" with an
"impartial jury."
197. Sanborn, supra note 9, at 231 (arguing that "the McKeiver opinion, even if it were sound
in 1971, can no longer survive scrutiny. It developed a picture of juvenile court that does not
meet today's reality."); Martin Guggenheim & Randy Hertz, Reflections on Judges, Juries, and
Justice. Ensuringthe Fairnessof Juvenile Delinquency Trials, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 553, 55557 & nn.9, 15 (1998) (citing four cases and fifteen commentaries making an argument similar to
Sanborn's, and suggesting that "juries are generally more likely than judges to be fair and just
triers of fact on the issue of guilt or innocence in a criminal or delinquency case").
Where courts and commentators do not recommend reversal of McKeiver, they still suggest
that their respective state's constitution and laws should be more protective of the jury trial
"right" than the U.S. Constitution as interpreted by McKeiver. See, e.g., In re C.B., 708 So. 2d
391, 400 (La. 1998) (in which the Louisiana Supreme Court first constitutionally required juvenile jury trials because the state's juvenile statutes have "sufficiently tilted the scales away from
a 'civil' proceeding, with its focus on rehabilitation, to one purely criminal").
198. For an authoritative account of the stare decisis doctrine, see Henry Paul Monaghan,
Stare Decisis and ConstitutionalAdjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 740 (1988) (framing the
question underlying the doctrine as: "Should the Court adhere to a prior controlling decision
even though a majority of the Court now believes the precedent to be inconsistent with original
understandingT').
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jury trials'9 9 pulls strongly against reversal when the costs, if anything, are higher in 2001.200 Although McKeiver's vitality is debatable, the decision seems likely to stand, and the only way around it

in the context of closure statutes appears to be the freestanding due
20
process claim. '

199. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 550 (predicting that "[i]f the jury trial were to be injected into the

juvenile court system as a matter of right, it would bring with it into that system the traditional
delay, the formality, and the clamor of the adversary system").
200. One commentator urging McReiver's reversal admits that"[i]f the jury trial [were today]
granted to all juvenile defendants nationwide ... real burdens could result." Sanborn, supra
note 9, at 237. Nonetheless, he notes that, as a practical matter, "where the right to jury trial has
existed, it has been exercised rarely." Id. Moreover, echoing a California appellate court, he
aptly points out that "policy considerations cannot dictate the fate of the right to jury trial Fundamental constitutional rights must be enforced whatever the administrative inconvenience or
financial cost." Id. (quoting In re Javier A., 206 Cal. Rptr. 386, 425 (Cal. Ct. App. 1934)).
201. There may be one other less conventional way. In the criminal context, Professor Amar
makes an intriguing observation that might be applied to the juvenile setting as well, especially
in today's more punitive, accountability-oriented juvenile courtroom. He observes:
Perhaps the public trial [is] also a right of, well, the public ....
T]he Ninth
Amendment explicitly cautions against a too-quick inference that the expression of one right (here, the accused's) implicitly negates another "right[ ].. . retained by the people." And this explicit reminder seems especially apt when we
deal with what are, quite literally, rights of "the people"-rights, that is, of the

public and populace at large.
AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 111, at 111 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IX (fThe enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people.")). From an array of historical sources, he calculates the original understanding of the Public Trial Clause in the overall constitutional scheme:
Sir Edward Coke declared that the very word court implied public access ....
Coke's contrast of courts with chambers had special meaning for eighteenthcentury Americans; one of the defining characteristics of the Star Chamber that
they had been taught to despise was that this (juryless) body interrogated suspects in private, not in public. Joseph Story echoed Coke's ode to openness in
his Commentaries on the Constitution, where he wrote that the Sixth Amendment "does but follow out the established course of the common law in all trials
for crimes. The trial is always public."
Id. (citing EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 103
(London: E. and R. Brooke, 5th ed., 1797), and quoting 3 JOSEPH STORY, CO.W-NTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1785 at 662 (Boston: Hillard, Gray, 1833)) (emphasis in
original). Professor Amar continues by stating the systemic importance of the public's right to be
present at criminal proceedings:
The framers crafted a system of republican governments, state and federalgovernments of, by, and for the people. Here, the people would rule-not day to
day, but ultimately, in the long run.... If citizens did not like what they saw
their government agents doing in open court, the people could throw the rascals
out at the next election, or could petition and agitate to change the law.
Id. at 112 (emphasis in original).
Given that it has recently legislated for juvenile punishment and accountability with some
vigor, see supra Part I.A, the public would seem to have nearly as large a stake in reviewing
juvenile proceedings as it does "criminal prosecutions." According to this line of reasoning, the
public needs to be confident that its legislative wishes are being carried out properly and fairly in
the juvenile courtroom. Alternatively, it at least needs to become informed about where the
system needs improvement and which of its participants need to be ousted in the next election.
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B. The Solution: The Juvenile's FreestandingDue Process Claim
With the First and Sixth Amendment claims against the closure statutes likely foreclosed, it is worth revisiting the text of the
Fourteenth Amendment: "No State shall ... deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law . . ,,102 At this

point in its history, the Due Process Clause unquestionably contains more protections than simply those specifically listed in the
Bill of Rights. 203 Furthermore, at this point in the juvenile court's
history, states regularly deprive juvenile offenders of their "liberty"
in the Fourteenth Amendment sense. The Supreme Court has emphatically and repeatedly affirmed that juvenile "commitment is a
deprivation of liberty. It is incarceration against one's will, whether
it is called 'criminal' or 'civil.'

"204

Of course, this fact by itself does

not create a constitutional problem. 205 The question presented,
therefore, is whether those states presumptively closing delinquency proceedings from the public and press have deprived youths'
liberty without due process-that is, without "fundamental fair07
ness. '20 6 This Note contends that they have. 2

While this argument may be politically unpalatable, and probably would not succeed in light
of the open-ended and perhaps unenforceable nature of the Ninth Amendment, it stands on insights that should not be ignored, especially because they arise once again in the due process
context.
202. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
203. See YALE KAMISAR ET AL., BASIc CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 34-35 (9th ed. 1999) ("[The

Court early found among the procedural requirements of Fourteenth Amendment due process
certain rules paralleling provisions of the first eight amendments .... The logically critical thing,
however .... was not that the rights had been found in the Bill of Rights, but that they were
deemed [to] be fundamental.") (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968) (Harlan,
J., dissenting)); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review,
and ConstitutionalRemedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 309 (1993) (noting that "[t]he Due Process
Clause generates rights, among other things, to administrative procedures, to judicial review of
administrative decisions, to judicial procedures, and to judicial remedies") [hereinafter Fallon,
Some Confusions About Due Process]; see generally GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 112, at
432-52 (discussing this "incorporation controversy").
204. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 530 (1975) (quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 50 (1967)); see
also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 366 (1970) (stating that a delinquent is "subjected to the loss of
his liberty for years") (quoting Gault, 387 U.S. at 36).
205. See Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword:The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARv. L. REV. 26,
113 (2000) C'[T]he document says that 'liberty' may be limited by 'due process oflaw.... When
government duly enacts evenhanded statutes and follows fair procedures, it has provided the
requisite 'due process of law.' ") (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1) [hereinafter Amar, The
Document and the Doctrine].
206. See infra Part II.A.1.
207. See infra Part II.A.2.
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1. Recognizing the Fundamental Fairness Doctrine
As with every other constitutional case concerning juvenile
proceedings, the due process case against closure statutes begins
with Gault. There, the Court framed the central issue addressed in
this Note: "As to [juvenile] proceedings, there appears to be little
current dissent from the proposition that the Due Process Clause
has a role to play. The problem is to ascertain the precise impact of
the due process requirement upon such proceedings." 203
In the relatively young, policy-oriented debate over the closure of juvenile court proceedings, the role of the Due Process
Clause, as such, has been largely ignored. Commentators have erroneously neglected Gault's due process starting point, jumping
209 or to the political implications of
straight to the First Amendment
"open[ing] the doors."210 For example, in arguing that the press has
a First Amendment right of access to juvenile proceedings, one
commentator quotes for authority Justice Black's incorporationbased Gault concurrence as an apparent starting point, rather than
Justice Fortas' due process-based majority opinion:
Where a person, infant or adult, can be seized by the State, charged, and convicted
for violating a state criminal law, and then ordered by the State to be confined for
six years, I think the Constitution requires that he be tried in accordance with the
guarantees of all the provisions21of the Bill of Rights made applicable to the States
by the Fourteenth Amendment. '

This quote fails to acknowledge that Justice Black's incorporation
approach lends little credence to the press's First Amendment case
against presumptive closure statutes, because the "liberty" that
Black recognized needed safeguarding was the juvenile's freedom
from incarceration, not the press's "liberty" of access.

212

The classic

208. Gault, 387 U.S. at 13-14.
209. See generally Dalton, supra note 15.
210. See generally Martin, Open the Doors, supra note 9 (concluding, as a policy matter, that
juvenile proceedings should be opened to rekindle public confidence in the system); Laubenstein,
supra note 8 (concluding, as a policy matter, that juvenile proceedings should be closed to promote rehabilitation); Emily Bazelon, Note, Public Access to Jutenile and Family Court. Should
the Courtroom Doors Be Opened or Closed?, 18 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 155 (1999) (enumerating
the arguments on both sides, including both policy and First Amendment access concerns, and
endorsing a pragmatic "balancing" approach whereby juvenile judges would be able to resolve the
difficult access question case-by-case).
211. Dalton, supranote 15, at 1195 (quoting Gault, 387 U.S. at 61 (Black, J., concurring)).
212. Gault, 387 U.S. at 59-64 (Black, J., concurring). Justice Black observed that, historically, state juvenile laws "from the first one on contained provisions, written in emphatic terms,
for arresting and charging juveniles with violations of state criminal laws, as well as for taking
juveniles by force of law away from their parents and turning them over... for confinement."
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problem for the First Amendment argument in this context, then, is
lack of standing by the press to assert the deprivation of the juve213
nile's Fourteenth Amendment "liberty."
To be sure, Justice Black's "total incorporation" 214 approach
does not help the juvenile in pursuit of open proceedings any more
than it does the press. The above quotation of Black's concurrence
omits a critical piece of that opinion:
Appellants are entitled to these rights [to notice, to counsel, to confrontation of
witnesses, and against self-incrimination], not because "fairness, impartiality and

Id. at 60. Nowhere, of course, did he mention any interest of the press, because that was not an
issue in the case. See generally id. at 59-64 (Black, J., concurring).
Professor Amar's view of the Public Trial Clause is instructive once again. Looking to history
and purpose, he finds that the Clause empowers the public to serve as a check on judicial function. AEHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 118

(1997) (finding that the people's "very presence in the courtroom can help discourage judicial
misbehavior') (citing MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 344 (6th
ed. 1820) ('[I]f the judge be PARTIAL, his partiality and injustice will be evident to all bystanders.")) [hereinafter AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE]. Because Dalton

similarly argues in the juvenile setting that a youth needs protection "against an arbitrary or
incompetent judge, a sentence not commensurate with the crime, or a barbaric prison with a
euphemistic moniker," Dalton, supra note 15, at 1229, it is striking that he did not examine the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, provisions that could directly vindicate the youth's interests
rather than the press's.
213. See, e.g., United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 20-22 (1960) (stating the general presumption that one person or party may not assert the constitutional rights of another person or
party); but see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As Applied and FacialChallenges and Third-PartyStanding, 113 HARv. L. REV. 1321, 1359-64 (2000) [hereinafter Fallen, Third PartyStanding]. Professor Fallen would find valid "the claims of a challenger who asserts that a single application of a
law both injures him and [thereby] impinges upon the constitutional rights of [identifiable] third
persons," especially in the First Amendment context. Id. at 1359 (quoting Note, Standing to
Assert ConstitutionalJus Tertii, 88 HARV. L. REV. 423, 423-24 (1974)). His conclusion gives the
First Amendment case some hope; if presumptive closure statutes violate the press's (potential)
right of access, they incidentally burden the juvenile's Fourteenth Amendment due process right
to have interested parties present that could reveal malfunction or abuse of discretion. See also
id. (noting that the Court has characterized the rule against third party standing as " 'prudential' and thus, apparently, as discretionary") (citing City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849,
1859 n.22 (1999)).
Regardless of whether or not a lack-of-standing argument would preempt the First Amendment claim, Dalton's analysis seems defensible on the whole. This Note simply suggests that, in
light of such First Amendment complications, the Fourteenth Amendment alternative should not
be ignored as it has been.
214. For more complete explications of Black's "total incorporation" model in a number of
contexts, see AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 111, at 139 CThe Fourteenth Amendment,
claimed Black, made applicable against the states each and every provision of the Bill, lock,
stock, and barrel-at least if we define the Bill to include only the first eight amendments.")
(citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 162-71 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting); Adamson v.
California, 332 U.S. 46, 68-123 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 47475 & n. 1 (1942) (Black, J., dissenting); HUGO LAFAYETTE BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH xvixvii, 34-42 (1968)); GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 112, at 432 (stating that Justice Black
"objected to the vague, 'natural law' formulations of the majority that spoke in terms of 'fundamentals' ").
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orderliness-in short, the essentials of due process"-require them and not because they are "the procedural rules which have been fashioned from the generality of due process," but because they are specifically and unequivocally granted by
which the Fourteenth Amendment makes applithe Fifth and Sixth21 Amendments
5
cable to the States.

As previously seen, the incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment of the Sixth Amendment's public trial requirement means
nothing to a juvenile; although the protection then applies in state
proceedings, McKeiver makes clear that it does not apply in state
those
are
not "criminal
juvenile proceedings
because
21
6
prosecutions." While Justice Black's Gault concurrence would undermine any constitutional challenge to the presumptive closure
statutes in this way,217 the Gault Court did not subscribe to his total incorporation approach and, for better or worse, his approach
218
has not succeeded outside of the juvenile context.

215. Gault, 387 U.S. at 61 (Black, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
216. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 541 (1971).
217. Recall, however, that Justice Black joined Justice Douglas's dissent in McKeiver,
agreeing with Justice Douglas that "the guarantees of the Bill of Rights, made applicable to the
States by the Fourteenth Amendment, require a jury trial" Id. at 558 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Especially given the textual intertwining of "public trial" and "an impartial jury [trial), see supra note 196, Justice Black apparently would have extended to juveniles in all fifty-one jurisdictions a public trial right, courtesy of total incorporation and in disregard of the Sixth Amendment "criminal prosecutions" roadblock. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 61 (Black, J., concurring) (I
think the Constitution requires that [juveniles] be tried in accordance with the guarantees of all
of the provisions of the Bill of Rights... . ") (emphasis added).
218. See GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supranote 112, at 432. Many of the Court's most controversial cases in the criminal procedure context and in the analogous substantive due process context
have relied upon a "fundamental rights" or "natural law" approach that has subjected the Court's
members to cries of judicial subjectivity. For one prominent criticism, see generally John Hart
Ely, Foreword On DiscomeringFundamental Values, 92 HARV. L REV. 5 (1978). Professor Ely
introduces his critique of the fundamental rights cases, including Roe v. ade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973), and its progeny, by quoting Alexander Bickeh
[I]t remains to ask the hardest questions. Which values, among adequately
neutral and general ones, qualify as sufficiently important or fundamental or
whathaveyou to be vindicated by the Court against other values affirmed by
legislative acts? And how is the Court to evolve and apply them? ... No answer
is what the wrong question begets ....
Id. at 5 (quoting ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 55, 103 (1962)).
The substantive due process cases are not precisely equivalent to the criminal procedure
cases, and this Note does not mean to commingle the two different categories. Nonetheless,
criticisms like Ely's are illustrative of Justice Black's view, in the criminal context and elsewhere, that the main benefit of the total incorporation model is its rigidity. That is, it may be
less likely than the fundamental fairness doctrine to result in judicial manipulation over time.
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 511-12 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (rejecting, in a
substantive due process case, the "premise that this Court is vested with the power to invalidate
all state laws that it consider[s] to be arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or oppressive," arguing
that it would "require judges to determine what is or is not constitutional on the basis of their
own appraisal of what laws are unwise or unnecessary"); Adamson, 332 U.S. at 69-70 (Black, J.,
dissenting) (rejecting, in a criminal procedure case, the Courts imposition of its own "conception
of what at a particular time constitutes 'civilized decency' and 'fundamental principles of liberty
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The Gault majority, instead, adhered to the dominant Due
Process Clause framework of "fundamental fairness. 219 This methodology, most frequently associated with Justice Frankfurter 220 and
the second Justice Harlan,2 21 "insists that, strictly speaking, the
Fourteenth Amendment .

.

. requires only that states honor basic

principles of fundamental fairness and ordered liberty-principles
that might indeed happen to overlap wholly or in part with some of
the rules of the Bill of Rights but that bear no logical relation to
those rules." 222 To the Gault Court, a juvenile's rights to notice of

and justice,'" arguing that it "degrade[s] the constitutional safeguards of the Bill of Rights and
simultaneously appropriate[s] for this Court a broad power which [was] not authorized by the
Constitution").
While Justice Black's subjectivity concerns should not be neglected, this Note finds that the
fundamental fairness methodology is just as viable a theory as total incorporation and recognizes
that the former is probably here to stay. It is certainly a methodology worth arguing in the juvenile closure context, especially because a juvenile's due process right to a public trial would have
Bill of Rights analogues in the First and Sixth Amendments. Cf. supraPart II.A.
219. Gault, 387 U.S. at 30-31 & n.47 (reiterating "that the hearing must measure up to the
essentials of due process and fair treatment," this time in "connection with a juvenile court adjudication of 'delinquency,' as a requirement which is part of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of our Constitution") (quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562
(1966)).
220. See, e.g., Adamson, 332 U.S. at 67 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (finding independent
procedural content in the Due Process Clause, and rejecting the "warped construction" of the
Fourteenth Amendment that would allow states to engage in "conduct clearly condemned by due
process but not easily fitting into the pigeon-holes of the specific provisions" of the Bill of Rights).
See generally Felix Frankfurter, Memorandum on 'Incorporation" of the Bill of Rights into the
Due Process Clause of the FourteenthAmendment, 78 HARV. L. REV. 746 (1965).
221. See, e.g., Gault, 387 U.S. at 67 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
C'Among the first premises of our constitutional system is the obligation to conduct any proceeding in which an individual may be deprived of liberty or property in a fashion consistent with the
traditions and conscience of our people.") (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105
(1934)).
Of course, the Justice Harlan referred to here was on the Court from 1955 to 1971. See
GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 112, app. at B-6. He is not to be confused with the first Justice Harlan, his grandfather, who was on the Court from 1877 to 1911. See id. app. at B-3.
222. AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supranote 111, at 139. Closely related to this methodology,
and just as helpful to the due process case against the presumptive closure statutes, is the "selec.
tive incorporation" model, explicated most notably by Justice Cardozo in the seminal 1937 Palko
decision. See generally Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). Under this approach, as the
Court explained in Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908),
[i]t is possible that some of the personal rights safeguarded by the first eight
Amendments against National action may also be safeguarded against state action, because a denial of them would be a denial of due process of law. If this is
so, it is not because those rights are enumerated in the first eight Amendments,
but because they are of such a nature that they are included in the conception
of due process of law.
Id. at 99 (internal citation omitted) (quoted in GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 112, at 434-35
(adding that, since Twining and Palko, "the Court has found most Bill of Rights guarantees
pertaining to the criminal process applicable to the states, but the Court has achieved that result
by finding Bill of Rights guarantees to be 'fundamental' one by one, rather than by incorporating

2001]

FARNESS IN THE KANGAROO COURTROOM

1791

charges, confrontation of witnesses, assistance of counsel, and the
privilege against self-incrimination were all inherent in and necessary to the American system of justice; 223 the enumeration of those
protections in the Bill of Rights perhaps just made that case even
224
more convincing.
The Gault Court left to future cases the question of what
other procedures were required to ensure a fundamentally fair juvenile court. 225 Applying the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard to juvenile proceedings when that issue was before it in Winship,2 26 the Court observed that "a person accused of a crime would

be at a severe disadvantage, a disadvantage amounting to a lack of
fundamental fairness, if he could be adjudged guilty and imprisoned for years on the strength of the same evidence as would suffice
in a civil case."227 The Winship ruling uniquely illustrates the independent power of the Due Process Clause; the protection of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt is, of course, nowhere to be found in the
Bill of Rights. 228 Not surprisingly, then, Justice Black dissented in
Winship on those very grounds, 229 charging that the standard was
not constitutionally required in either criminal or juvenile proceedings.2 0

them in one fell swoop, as Justice Black would have done") (emphasis in original)). For broad,
comparative discussions on all three incorporation models and their respective adherents, see
HENRY J. ABRAHAM & BARBARA A. PERRY, FREEDOM AND THE COURT. CIVIL RIGHTS AND
LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES 83-91 (1998); see generally AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra

note 111, at xiii-xv, 137-307.
223. Gault, 387 U.S. at 33-34, 49-51, 56-57.
224. Justice Brennan, one of the main proponents of the selective incorporation model, see
supra note 111, joined in the majority opinion, likely because the rights' enumeration in the Bill
was strong evidence to him that they are fundamental. See AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra
note 111, at 139-40 (discussing Brennan's "back door" move toward total incorporation via the

possibility that every right in the Bill would be held fundamental and, therefore, incorporated);
cf. supra note 222.

225. Gault, 387 U.S. at 13 (clarifying that neither the procedures "applicable to the prejudicial stages of the juvenile process, nor.., the post-adjudicative or dispositional process[es]"
were at issue in Gault).
226. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); see also supraPart I.B.2.
227. Winship, 397 U.S. at 363 (quoting In re Winship, 247 N.E.2d 253, 259 (N.Y. 1969) (Fuld,
C.J., dissenting)); see also id. at 369 (Harlan, J., concurring) (I am in full agreement that this
statutory provision offends the requirement of fundamental fairness embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment....).
228. See generally U.S. CONS'r. amends. I-VII. But cf. U.S. CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people.").
229. Winship, 397 U.S. at 377 (Black, J., dissenting) ("[Nowhere in that document is there
any statement that conviction of a crime requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt.").
230. Id. at 377-85 (Black, J., dissenting).
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Even in McKeiver231 and Breed,232 a majority of the Court
again invoked the fundamental fairness doctrine. In holding that
young offenders were not constitutionally entitled to a jury trial,
the McKeiver Court rejected a freestanding due process argument
in addition to the more visible Sixth Amendment claim. 233 The plurality recognized that "the applicable due process standard in juvenile proceedings, as developed by Gault and Winship, is fundamental fairness,"

23

4

but it nonetheless rejected the notion that a jury

was an indispensable component of fair fact-finding in the juvenile
courtroom.

23 5

Similarly, though it extended to juveniles the protec-

tion against double jeopardy solely on Fifth Amendment incorporation grounds, 236 the Breed Court also acknowledged that fundamental fairness was the touchstone in the Court's other juvenile decisions. 237
In short, a majority of the Court has explicitly found that,
under the Due Process Clause's freestanding procedural content,
some safeguards are constitutionally required to ensure the fundamental fairness of juvenile proceedings, and some are not. The
Court has not decided into which category an open hearing falls,
but the best evidence indicates that it falls into the former, rendering presumptive closure statutes unconstitutional.

231. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971); see also supraPart I.B.2.
232. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975); see also supraPart I.B.2.

233. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 540-41 (rejecting the Sixth Amendment argument); id. at 541.43
(rejecting the due process argument).
234. Id. at 543.
235. Id. at 543, 550.
236. Breed, 421 U.S. at 531, 541 ("We hold that the prosecution of respondent in Superior

Court, after an adjudicatory proceeding in juvenile court, violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of
the Fifth Amendment, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment."). Ono
would presume that, had he still been on the Court at the time of Breed, Justice Black would
have (perhaps triumphantly) joined in the Courts unanimous "incorporation" opinion. Justice
Black, however, had resigned on September 17, 1971, less than three months after he had joined

Justice Douglas's McKeiver dissent. See BOB WOODWARD & ScOTr ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN
184 (1979). On September 23, Justice Harlan, one of Black's long-time opponents in the incorporation controversy, sent his resignation to President Nixon as well. See id. at 185. On September 25, at age seventy-one, Justice Black passed away. See id.
237. Breed, 421 U.S. at 531 (noting that the "jeopardy" to which a youth might be subjected
multiple times, including litigation expenses and other "burdens incident to a juvenile's defense,"
had increased "since our decisions implementing fundamental fairness in the juvenile court
system").
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2. Applying the Fundamental Fairness Doctrine to Presumptive
Closure Statutes
In its 1948 In re Oliver2 8 decision, where it held unconstitutional the secret investigation of a one-man grand jury,2 9 the Supreme Court recognized that there are at least three benefits of
holding court proceedings in public. 2 40 First, the Court found that
publicity's most important function is to restrain misuse of judicial
authority2 1 Second, it observed that "public trials come to the attention of key witnesses unknown to the parties. Those parties may
242
then voluntarily come forward and give important testimony."
Third, the Court noted that "the spectators learn about their government and acquire confidence in their judicial remedies." 243 No
doubt, all three of these benefits are relevant to the overall case
against presumptive closure statutes in the juvenile setting. The
most important consideration to the fundamental fairness inquiry

238. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
239. Id. at 272-74. To be precise, the Court held that, because of the "dangers to freedom"
inherent in secret proceedings, along with "the universal requirement of our federal and state
governments that criminal trials be public, the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee that no one
shall be deprived of his liberty without due process of law" required one-man grand jury investigations to be conducted in the open. Id. at 273.
Thus, the Court's holding was not based on the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a public
trial in "criminal prosecutions." Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial...."). Indeed, the Sixth Amendment is
mentioned but once in the Courts opinion, and even then only to illustrate that, at the time of
the decision, forty-one jurisdictions had adopted state constitutional provisions or statutes similar to the Sixth Amendments guarantee. Oliver, 333 U.S. at 267-68 & nn.16-20. The decision
rested squarely on the Fourteenth Amendment's procedural due process requirement of accuracy
in proceedings that can potentially result in a deprivation of liberty. Id. at 273-74 (reaffirming
the recognition that "departure from the accepted standards of due process [is] capable of grave
abuses," and discussing a line of Court precedent establishing baseline procedural due process
requirements, including the rights "to examine the witnesses ... to offer testimony, and to be
represented by counsel"); see also infra note 248 and accompanying text.
The great irony of this Due Process Clause-based decision is that none other than the stalwart opponent of selective incorporation and fundamental fairness-Justice Black-wrote the
majority opinion. Oliver, 333 U.S. at 258. One can only assume that he was satisfied that the
right to open one-man grand jury proceedings had strong textual support in the Bill of Rights,
with a Sixth Amendment "public trial" analogue.
240. Id. at 270 & n.24.
241. Id. at 270.
242. Id. at 270 n.24.
243. Id.; see also JOHN HENRY VIGMORE, 6 EVIDENCE § 1834(2) at 438 (Chadbourn rev. 1976)
(stating that publicity provides "a strong confidence in judicial remedies ...which could never be
inspired by a system of secrecy"); Timothy B. Dyk, Newsgathering, Press Access, and the First
Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 927, 929 (1992) (arguing that the press should enjoy "a special
constitutional right of access in newsgathering" so that it can "bare the secrets of government
and inform the people") (quoting New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971)
(Black, J., concurring)); supranote 201.
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here, however, is the first-the necessity of "review in the forum of
public opinion" as a check on "any attempt to employ our courts as
244
instruments of persecution."
The Oliver Court's willingness to apply procedural due process protections traditionally reserved for criminal prosecutions to a
proceeding that, on its face, was not precisely a criminal trial apparently stemmed from its observation that "this nation[ ] [has a]
historic distrust of secret proceedings." 245 In emphasizing both this
historical distrust 246 as well as the functional underpinnings of
public scrutiny, 247 the Court simultaneously de-emphasized the nature of the proceedings in which that public scrutiny would be absolutely essential to ensure the fairness and accuracy guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment's procedural content. 248 Thus, its
warnings of unchecked judicial discretion2 49 are strong evidence
that openness is essential for fundamental fairness in today's juvenile courts, 250 where, in nineteen jurisdictions, presumptive closure
25 1
statutes shield juvenile judges from public view.
244. Oliver, 333 U.S. at 270.
245. Id. at 273.
246. Id. at 266-69. The Court discussed at great length "[tihis nation's long accepted practice
of guaranteeing a public trial," which "has its roots in our English common law heritage." Id. at
266. Indeed, the Court remarked that the parties "have not cited and we have been unable to
find a single instance of a criminal trial conducted in camera in any federal, state, or municipal
court during the history of this country." Id.
247. Id. at 270-71.
248. See id. at 266-73. The Court warned that the lack of public review of judges "symbol.
ize[s] a menace to liberty... in ruthless disregard of the right of an accused to a fair trial," Id.
at 269-70. Procedural due process is the dominant theme throughout the opinion. See, e.g., id.
at 272 C'This Court [has previously] assumed that a criminal trial conducted in secret would
violate the procedural requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment's [D]ue [P]rocess [Clauso...
."). In fact, Justice Black's majority opinion invoked the same sort of "natural law" and "national
conscience" language that he so vehemently rejected on other occasions:
In view of this nation's historic distrust of secret proceedings [and] their inherent dangers to freedom, ... the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee that no one shall be deprived of his liberty without due process of law means at least that an accused cannot
be thus sentenced to prison.
Id. at 273; see also id. at 278 "It is 'the law of the land' that no man's life, liberty, or property be
forfeited as a punishment until there has been a charge fairly made and fairly tried in a public
tribunal.") (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 236 (1940)). Justice Black's opinion in
Chamberswas an even greater deviation from his otherwise mechanical incorporation approach.
See ABRAHAM & PERRY, supranote 222, at 114 n.96 (noting that "the Chambers opinion contains
one of the great Black exhortations: 'Under our constitutional system courts stand against any
winds that blow as havens of refuge for those who might otherwise suffer because they are help.
less, weak, outnumbered, or because they are nonconforming victims of prejudice and public
excitement' ") (quoting Chambers, 309 U.S. at 241) (emphasis in original).
249. See Oliver, 333 U.S. at 269-71.
250. The Court briefly mentioned delinquency proceedings in a footnote: "Whatever may be
the classification of juvenile court proceedings, they are often conducted without admitting all
the public. But it has never been the practice wholly to exclude parents, relatives, and friends,
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Such statutes allow access to delinquency proceedings only

2
upon a "direct" or "proper" interest determination by the judge,
and thus circumvent the primary purpose of access-reduction of
judicial abuse and error.25 3 Finding themselves quite competent, or

harboring political motives they do not want revealed, juvenile
judges often see no reason to grant access to the public or to the
press, whose only "direct" or "proper" interest is to reveal potential
abuse.2 54 Justice Brennan has pointed out the problems inherent in
such schemes. In his McKeiver opinion, Justice Brennan concurred

in the plurality's McKeiver judgment, but he dissented from its
judgment in the companion case, In re Burrus.

which commentators have too often

neglected,=6

5

This opinion,

serves as an ex-

cellent foundation for the case against presumptive closure statutes:
For me ...the question in these cases is whether [a] jury trial is among the "essentials of due process and fair treatment. "2=

or to refuse juveniles the benefit of counseL" Id. at 266 n.12. The issue presented in this Note, of
course, was not befare the Oliver Court, and this footnote in Oliver is the only mention ofjuvenile
proceedings. In any event, since the time of the Oliver decision in 1948, juvenile proceedings
have changed dramatically. See supraPart . This Note essentially argues that, in light of the
juvenile court's paradigm shift, the Court would today reject a juvenile exception to the Oliver
Court's general proposition that court proceedings may not be conducted in private without some
effective check on discretion.
251. See supranote 13.
252. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN.§ 16-2316(e) (1997 & Lexis Supp. 2000) (providing that the juvenile court may "admit such other persons (mcluding members of the press) as have a proper
interest in the case," but not mandating such admission). The statute, similar to other closure
statutes, allows discretion for the judge to determine that members of the public or press have no
interest in the proceeding or, alternatively, that they should be excluded even if they do have a
proper interest. See also supranote 13.
253. See Note, Trial Secrecy, supra note 144, at 1905 (recognizing the interrelated goals of
public access to judicial proceedings-inducing court officers to perform conscientiously by forcing them to act within the public's view, and empowering the public to see those officers in action
so that it may determine if they are acting properly); see also In re R.LK., 269 N.V.2d 367, 37071 (Minn. 1978); Sanborn, supra note 9, at 236 (showing that public accountability keeps the
judge under control by "eliminat[mg] the hearing's secret nature, which both hides and promotes
carelessness and cavalier attitudes").
254. Some states have judicially established a per se rule that "the news media have a 'direct
interest' in the work of a juvenile court" because they "obtain[ ] information regarding our legal
institutions" and "inform[ ] the public about how judicial power in juvenile courts is being exercised." R.L.K, 269 N.W.2d at 370-71; see also, eg., In re L, 546 P.2d 153, 155 n.1 (Or. Ct. App.
1976). Not surprisingly, these states do not have presumptive closure statutes, because they
would have little or no effect.
255. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 553 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in the
judgment in No. 322 [McKeiver] and dissenting in No. 128 [Burrus]).
256. It appears that only Dalton discusses Justice Brennan's McKeiver opinion in any detail.
Dalton, supra note 15, at 1212-13.
257. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 553 (opinion of Brennan, J.) (quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30
(1967)).
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[T]he States are not bound to provide jury trials on demand so long as some other
aspect of the process adequately
protects the interests that Sixth Amendment jury
trials are intended to serve. 258
Examined in this light, I find no defect in the Pennsylvania [McKeiver] case[ ] before us .... The North Carolina [Burrus] case[ ], however, present[s] a different
situation. North Carolina law either permits or requires the exclusion of the general public from juvenile trials. In the case[ ] before us, the trial judge "ordered the
general public excluded from the hearing room and stated that only officers of the
court, the juveniles, their parents or guardians, their attorney and witnesses
would be present for the hearings," notwithstandingpetitioners' repeated demand
for a public hearing.5 9
The [Burrus] case[ ] [itself], which arise[s] out of a series of demonstrations by
black adults and juveniles who believed that the Hyde County, North Carolina,
school system unlawfully discriminated against black schoolchildren, present[s] a
paradigm of the circumstances in which there may be a substantial "temptation to
use the courts for political ends." And finally, neither the opinions supporting the
judgment nor the respondent in [Burrus] has pointed to any feature of North
Carolina juvenile proceedings that could substitute for public or jury trial in pro.
tecting the petitioners against misuse of the judicial process. 20

The opinion illustrates three key points in support of the due
process case against presumptive closure statutes. First, and most
importantly, it acknowledges that the applicable standard in de-

termining if closure statutes violate the Due Process Clause is
whether they will result in proceedings that are fundamentally unfair. 26 1
Second, Justice Brennan's opinion demonstrates that, in an-

swering this touchstone question, we must consider available alternatives to access that can similarly guard against juvenile judges'
virtually limitless discretion. 262 A number of observers and academics have amassed much unsettling evidence indicating that juvenile judges, at best, have unevenly exercised their discretion and,

258. Id. at 554 (Brennan, J.) (emphasis added).
259. Id. at 554-56 (Brennan, J.) (emphasis added) (quoting In re Burrus, 167 S.E.2d 454, 456
(N.C. Ct. App. 1969)). The North Carolina statute to which Justice Brennan refers has been
repealed. North Carolina now holds presumptively open proceedings, courtesy of N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 7B-801(a) (1999).
260. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 556 (Brennan, J.) (quoting McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 522 (White, J.,
concurring)).
261. Id. at 553-54 (Brennan, J.) ('The Due Process Clause commands not a particular procedure, but only a result: in my Brother BLACKMUN's words, 'fundamental fairness... [in] fact.
finding.' ").
262. Id. at 554 (Brennan, J.) ('[T]he due process question [must] be decided ...in terms of
the adequacy of a particular state procedure to protect the [juvenile] from oppression by the
government,... and to protect him against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge.") (quoting
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968); Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 31 (1965)),
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at worst, have shamelessly abused it.26 Indeed, without fear of consequences, biased judges who may remember particular delinquents
from previous occasions have been known to act on an unjustifiable
predisposition to quickly incarcerate these youths.C4 Worse yet, in
transfer proceedings, some judges have casually shuffled such offenders off to the adult system, subjecting them to even harsher,
albeit more procedurally sound, treatment. 265 While transfer may
266 all too
well be justified in many of these repeat-offender cases,
often judges have, without due procedure, waived to the criminal
courts youths who might have been better served by what remains
of the rehabilitation ethic in juvenile detention facilities. 267 Also,
disturbingly, a disproportionate number of these mistreated offenders have been racial minorities. 268

263. See, e.g., Feld, Race and the "Crack Down"on Youth Crime, supra note 3, at 373 n.147
(citing sources indicating that "individualized sentencing discretion is often synonymous with
racial discrimination"); Jeffrey Fagan & Elizabeth Piper Deschenes, Determinants of Judicial
Waiver Decisionsfor Violent Juvenile Offenders, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIZNOLOGY 314, 347 (1990));
Podkopacz & Feld, An Empirical Study of Judicial Waiver, supra note 4, at 453 (concluding from
an empirical analysis that "judicial waiver practices are inherently arbitrary, capricious, and
E TWo
discriminatory") (citing DONNA i HAMPARiAN ET AL., YOUTH IN ADULT CouRT: Bc 'NE
WORLDS 102-07 (1982); Ross, supra note 37, at 1038-45 (describing how the juvenile judge's
discretion has recently come "under fire" because large portions of society believe it has been
exercised erratically); Wizner, supra note 96, at 1034 (suggesting that judges have doled out
punishment and rehabilitation arbitrarily, not because they are biased, but because "we are not
capable of articulating or agreeing upon a precise definition of the juvenile offender who should,
in every case, be prosecuted in the adult criminal court").
264. See Barry C. Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice Rules of Procedure for Juvenile
Court, 69 MINN.L REV. 141, 245-46 (1984) (showing that juvenile judges are more likely to convict than juries are, partially because they are subjected to excessive amounts of prejudicial
information, like seeing the same youth on multiple occasions).
265. See generally Catherine R. Guttman, Note, Listen to the Children: 7e Decision to
Transfer Juveniles to Adult Court, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L L. REV. 507 (1995) (arguing, among other
things, that lack of judicial accountability leads to arbitrary sentencing and transfer, especially
because judges can and do discriminate on the basis of race).
266. The juvenile's prior history is one of Kent's suggested criteria governing waiver decisions, and it is now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1994). Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 56667 (1966); see also supra note 100.
267. See generally Abbe Smith, They Dream of Growing Older: On Kids and Crime, 36 B.C. L
REV. 953, 1003-12 (1995) (providing a rather literary account of how the juvenile system, through
both its social policy and adjudication, has sought revenge against youths as a class, punishing
even those who could be rehabilitated) (quoting "Officer Mazilli" from RICHARD PRICE, CLOCCER
95 (1992) CYou want to know what I believe in? I believe in punishment, I believe in fear, and I
believe in revenge") (emphasis in original)).
268. See Feld, Race and the "CrackDown" on Youth Crime, supra note 3, at 373-78 (detailing
the historical and current systemic bias against non-whites in the juvenile system generally and
in the transfer mechanism specifically); see also id. at 379 ("Despite 'rehabilitative rhetoric' and a
euphemistic vocabulary, the simple truth is that juvenile court judges increasingly consign disproportionately minority offenders to overcrowded custodial warehouses that constitute little
more than youth prisons."); Podkopacz & Feld, An Empirical Study of Judicial Waiver, supra
note 4, at 454 & n.22 (citing to evidence that a young offender's race affects the waiver decision).
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Thus, some restraint on discretion is essential not simply to
assure that youths are punished justly. 269 It is also necessary to en-

sure that those offenders amenable to treatment are identified as
such and placed in an environment that suits their rehabilitative
needs, to the extent possible.27 Were juveniles entitled to jury trials, there would already be a "tolerably efficient check" 271 in place to
counter the juvenile judge's discretion. 272 But they are not, 273 and

269. This, however, would seem to be the primary objective, given the system's present amphasis on punishment. See Sanborn, supra note 9, at 236 (declaring that the "ever-increasing
tendency ofjuvenile courts to respond punitively to young offenders ...demonstrates that juvenile defendants need additional protections against the judge and the system"); see also supra
Part I.A.2.
"Justly," in this context, means only "as accurately as possible." Obviously, no defendant is
entitled to a perfect proceeding; rather, the Court "consistently has held" that the "fundamental
requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo,
380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). Of course, the content of "meaningful manner" varies case-by-case. In
Mathews, the Court elucidated three factors for determining what procedures are 'due' under
procedural due process in a specific case. They are, "[flirst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action,] second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used... and finally, the Government's interest, including the ... fiscal
and administrative burdens that [an] additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail." Id. at 335.
As Professor Fallon demonstrates, even though "the Supreme Court has treated Mathews as
a furnishing test for all seasons, it was designed for resolving claims of entitlement to particular
types of administrative, rather than judicial, procedures." Fallon, Some Confusions About Due
Process, supra note 203, at 331 (emphasis omitted). Nonetheless, it does help illustrate why
youths should be entitled to a public trial under the fundamental fairness doctrine. Merely allowing members of the press into a juvenile courtroom-a negative, not affirmative, actionwould probably impose few, if any, additional "fiscal and administrative burdens" on a state
government. On the other side of the Mathews equation, many youths literally have years of
'liberty" riding on the juvenile courts procedures, which have empirically proven less than
reliable on the "risk of an erroneous deprivation" prong. See supra notes 96-109, 263-68 and
accompanying text.
270. But see Sanborn, supra note 9, at 238 C'[]uvenile courts are free to promote rehabilitation for the non-serious offender who is not about to be given severe sanctions by the court. For
most juvenile defendants, juvenile courts can preserve their traditional identities by operating
without juries or the public.").
What Sanborn ignores is the murky line between punishment and rehabilitation, which
makes it administratively impossible to determine at the margins which youths are entitled to a
public trial and which are not. More problematic still is that this arbitrary determination would
once again be left to the judge's sole-unchecked---discretion. Sanborn's "check" would thus
seem to be no check at all in a rather large percentage of cases.
271. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 271 (1948) (quoting 1 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF
JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 524 (1827)).
272. See McKeiver, 403 U.S. 528, 554 (1971) (Brennan, J.) C"The Due Process Clause commands not a particular procedure, but only a result ....[Wihat this means is that the States are
not bound to provide [any particular procedure] on demand so long as some ... aspect of the
process adequately protects the [juvenile] ...against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge.")
(quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968)).
273. See id. at 528-41 (plurality opinion).
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there is not.274 Access to juvenile proceedings, therefore, becomes
the only suitable proxy to ensure a youth fundamental fairness in
his punishment, or, if the judge so chooses, in his rehabilitation.
Third, Justice Brennan's McKeiuer/Burrus opinion indicates
that some juveniles would request that members of the public or
press be present at their delinquency hearings, 275 and it suggests
that denying such a request violates fundamental fairness.2 6 Indeed, the Burrus case offers the "paradigm" example of a
violation. 277 The youths in that case recognized a potential bias on
the judge's behalf, and calculated that the risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty behind closed doors was greater than the opposing risk of social stigmatization in the open. The North Carolina
closure statute in Burrus, 278 however, delegated the juveniles'

choice in this matter to the judge, who apparently had more to gain
from closure.
Assuming that procedural safeguards are meant to protect
the innocent,279 the delegation of this choice from a putative of-

274. See Dalton, supranote 15, at 1228 (concluding that the media's First Amendment right
of access to juvenile proceedings would provide juveniles much-needed leverage in a system that
is "struggling, arbitrary, secretive [and] unable to offer to juvenile defendants anything better
than the luck of the draw").
275. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 556 (Brennan, J.). The concrete factual circumstances of the Burrus case are in stark contrast to the juvenile court's original, overly abstract, conventional wisdor that young offenders would never want the public present. Sce, e.g., Bazelon, supra note
210, at 169 ("Ifcourts were closed to the public, a child could confess his troubles without fear of
public stigma. Closed records would prevent a record of juvenile offenses from being used
against [him as a] defendant[] in adult court") (citing RYERSON, supranote 3, at 39-40); cf. id. at
156 ("[Confidentiality is still viewed as a protective measure-but increasingly one that juvenile
delinquents do not deserve").
276. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 554-57 (Brennan, J.).
277. Id. at 556 (Brennan, J.); see also supranote 260 and accompanying text.
278. The text of the statute at issue, which is no longer on the books, see supra note 259,
permitted but did not require closure. McKeier, 403 U.S. at 556 n.4 (opinion of Brennan, J.). As
Justice Brennan notes, however, the North Carolina Supreme Court in Burrus itself read the
statute "as a legislative determination that a public hearing is [not] in the best interest of the
youthful offender." Id. (Brennan, J.) (quoting In re Burrus, 169 S.E.2d 879, 887 (N.C. 1969)).
279. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text. For two thorough accounts-from a
prominent constitutional scholar-arguing that protecting the innocent instead of the guilty is
precisely what constitutional criminal procedure is meant to accomplish, see generally A.MAR,
THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 111, and AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRMNAL PROCEDURE,
supra note 212. This point is less obvious than it might seem. Professor Amar demonstrates
that "Supreme Court case law in this field is remarkably complex, sometimes perverse, and often
contradictory," mostly because it protects the guilty at the expense of the innocent. A?/4R, THE
CONsrITUTION AND CRIMHNAL PROCEDURE, supranote 212, at x. An illustrative and entertaining
snapshot of Professor Amar's argument concerns the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment today is an embarrassment .... [The] three pillars of
modern Fourth Amendment case law [namely, that the Amendment generally
requires warrants for searches and arrests, probable cause for searches and arrests, and exclusion of ill-gotten evidence] are hard to support; in fact, today's
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fender to the judge becomes quite troublesome. Innocent defendants
have the most to gain from publicity, even where the rehabilitation
ethic prevails, and guilty (i.e., "delinquent") defendants have the
most to lose. 28 0 For example, assume that a juvenile is "taken into

custody" for a robbery that he did not commit. He is a black male,
and believes that the judge is a racist who transfers a disproportionate number of black youths to the adult criminal system, where
transferees are subjected to harsh punishment. This judge, of
course, has sole discretion in determining whether the juvenile is
delinquent, whether he should be transferred, and, if he is not
transferred, what treatment best suits his needs. Concerned that
the judge is biased, the juvenile requests that the delinquency and
transfer hearings be held in the open. The judge, for whatever reason, denies the request.
Whether the juvenile is correct or incorrect that the judge is
biased makes little difference here. Even if there is almost no
chance that she is biased, the juvenile has calculated that it is more
important for him to eliminate this risk of an erroneous deprivation
of liberty than to eliminate the public stigma that might result from
the open proceedings. In the name of rehabilitation, which often
wrongfully deprives an innocent juvenile of his liberty in the same
manner that punishment does, presumptive closure statutes lodge
the access choice with the one person who actually may not exercise
it in the child's "best interest." Ironically, the Supreme Court has
held that a young offender is capable of making a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights in the
coercive setting of a police interrogation room. 281 In light of this juSupreme Court does not really support them. Except when it does. Warrants
are not required-unless they are. All searches and seizures must be grounded
in probable cause-but not on Tuesdays. And unlawfully seized evidence must
be excluded whenever five votes say so ....
The result is [that] . .. [c]riminals
go free while honest citizens are intruded upon in outrageous ways with little
or no real remedy.
Id. at 1; see generally Akhil Reed Amar, FourthAmendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV.
757 (1994).
280. See AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 111, at 112-13 (demonstrating, in the adult

context, that "the ability of the public to judge the judge ... protect[s] innocent defendants from
judicial corruption or oppression, but public scrutiny [is] bad news for many a guilty defendant,

who might prefer an incompetent judge or one 'partial' to the defendant's cause-an old political
friend, perhaps, or a new financial one. So too, the public right to monitor witnesses at trial [is]

designed to help the truth come out, and truth [will] as a rule help innocent defendants more
than guilty ones.").
281. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724-25 (1979) C'[The determination whether state-

ments obtained during custodial interrogation are admissible against the accused is to be made
upon an inquiry into the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, to ascertain

whether the accused in fact knowingly and voluntarily decided to forgo his rights to remain si-
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risprudence, the paternalistic assumption that such an offender is
less able than a juvenile judge to determine his own best interests
thus seems anachronistic, inconsistent and a little peculiar.

No doubt, many guilty youths will waive the due process
right to a public trial once recognized.n Moreover, many innocent

youths will probably waive it as well, believing that the judge is
competent and impartial,m and that the greater risk is being labeled a criminal in the community. The power to make that deci-

sion, however, should rest with the juvenile, and with the counsel to
which he is constitutionally entitled.25 The Due Process Clause requires no less.

CONCLUSION
While the Supreme Court has acknowledged the juvenile
court's systemic objective of rehabilitation,2 6 it has recognized that

the system has fallen far short of its rehabilitative goals.2 7 Even
though it has conceded that parens patriae informality may assist
juvenile judges in personalizing treatment for a particular wayward

youth, 28 it has declared that informality and discretion must not
come at the expense of liberty and procedure.U9 Despite the Court's

appreciation for the rehabilitative value of hiding "youthful errors
from the full gaze of the public and bury[ing] them in the graveyard

of the forgotten past,"290 it has suggested that confidentiality and
closure may actually harm juvenile offenders.2' Additionally, although the Court has held that juvenile proceedings are not" 'crimi-

nal prosecution[s],' within the meaning and reach of the Sixth

lent and to have the assistance of counsel. ..we discern no persuasive reasons why any other
approach is required where the question is whether a juvenile has waived his rights, as opposed
to whether an adult has done so.") (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475-77 (1966)). But
cf Robert E. McGuire, Note, A Proposal to Strengthen Juvenile Miranda Rights: RequiringParentalPresence in CustodialInterrogations,53 VAND. L REV. 1355, 1387 (2000) (concluding that,
in the custodial interrogation setting, "we must pay special attention to the needs ofjuveniles").
282. Cf. supra note 86.
283. Cf. supra notes 279-80.
284. One would hope that these innocent youths are correct in this belief most of the time.
285. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967) (holding that the Due Process Clause provides juvenile defendants the right to counsel in delinquency proceedings).
286. See supraPart LA.1.
287. See supra Part .A.2.
288. See, e.g., Gault,387 U.S. at 15-17.
289. See supra Part LB.2.; see also, e.g., Gault, 387 U.S. at 18 ("Juvenile court history has...
demonstrated that unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor
substitute for principle and procedure.").
290. Gault,387 U.S. at 24.
291. See, e.g., id. at 22.
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Amendment,"2 92 it has repeatedly eschewed the " 'civil' label-ofconvenience" 293 that stubbornly clings to them. Perhaps most importantly of all, it has rejected the distinction between 'civil' and
'criminal' as a basis "for holding the Due Process Clause inapplica294
ble to a juvenile proceeding."
Indeed, the Due Process Clause is the strongest constitutional foundation upon which to rest the case against the presumptive closure statutes. In the jury trial context, two prominent juvenile law scholars have criticized the petitioners in McKeiver for
honing in on policy distinctions and the Sixth Amendment rather
than on the Due Process Clause:
With hindsight, it is apparent that a central shortcoming of the McKeiver appel-

lants' argument was that it did not sufficiently emphasize the Court's "fundamental fairness" analysis. The appellants did not make clear precisely why the jury

trial model is indispensable to a "fundamentally fair" trial or in what manner this
model significantly furthers the interests of accuracy and fairness.

This same mistake should not be made when arguing the case
against presumptive closure statutes, which are fundamentally unfair because they do296
not allow public scrutiny to counterbalance the
"menace to liberty"
of unchecked judicial discretion in juvenile
297
proceedings.
As Justice Black demonstrated on numerous occasions, "fundamental fairness" is an admittedly murky standard by which to
determine the constitutionality of the statutes that close today's
delinquency proceedings. 298 Courts faced with the task might follow
Justice Scalia's lead by looking for guidance in the U.S. Constitution's Preamble. 299 Like the Fourteenth Amendment, the Preamble
is open-ended, but it does serve to remind us that one of the six reasons we "ordain[ed]" our Constitution was to "secure the Blessings
of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity."300 If the Due Process
292. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 525, 541 (1971).
293. Gault, 387 U.S. at 50.

294. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365 (1970).
295. Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 197, at 560 (citing McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 541.43, 550
(describing the appellants' arguments)).
296. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 269 (1948).
297. Gault, 387 U.S. at 18-19 (In 1937, Dean Pound wrote: 'The powers of the Star Chamber
were a trifle in comparison with those of our juvenile courts .

. . .'

The absence of substantive

standards has not necessarily meant that children receive careful, compassionate, individualized
treatment .... Departures from established principles of due process have frequently resulted
not in enlightened procedure, but in arbitrariness.") (citation omitted).

298. See supra notes 214-15, 218, 236 and accompanying text. But see supra notes 239, 248.
299. See Amar, The Document and the Doctrine, supra note 205, at 114 n.292 (describing
Justice Scalia's recent willingness to invoke the Preamble).
300. U.S. CONST. preamble (emphasis added).
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Clause does not provide sufficient textual endorsement of the constitutional case against the presumptive closure statutes, perhaps
this neglected passage does.
Stephan E. Oestreicher,Jr.*

* For Salima Parmar, to whom-as always--I owe the largest debt of gratitude. I would
also like to thank Stephanie Blackman, Matthew Richardson, Deborah Reule, and Matthew
Festa for their thoughtful edits; Professor Thomas McCoy, Omar Kilany, and Robert Roo3 for
comments on an earlier draft; James Beakes and the Vanderbilt Law Reuiew Managing Department for painstaking attention to footnotes; and Jim Ilkenhans for the Guinness.

